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ARTICLES
LAWS, SAUSAGES, AND BAILOUTS:
TESTING THE POPULIST VIEW OF THE
CAUSES OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS*
J. Scott Colesanti**
INTRODUCTION
While the lingering economic crisis has drawn much attention to
individual products1 and private sector villains2 thought to have caused the
market meltdown, a pointed study of the full range of government causes
(and their attendant depth) has to date proven less attractive to authors and
critics. It is now axiomatic—even among the financial survivors and victors
of the crisis—that Wall Street fell victim to an unprecedented myopia.3 It is
commonly accepted that regulation was flawed,4 but the exact degree to
* Folklore attributes the referenced quote, “No one should be forced to see how laws or
sausages are made,” along with a variety of other constructions, to Mark Twain or Otto Von
Bismark. See Fred R. Shapiro, Quote . . . Misquote, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 21, 2008, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/21/magazine/27wwwl-guestsafire-t.html; see also Memorable
Quotes
and
Quotations
from
Mark
Twain,
http://www.memorable-quotes.com
/mark+twain,a99.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2010).
** J. Scott Colesanti is an Assistant Professor at the Hofstra University School of Law,
teaching, among other courses, Securities Regulation, Corporate Governance, and Broker-Dealer
Regulation. Professor Colesanti previously taught at the Saint Louis University School of Law and
is a member of the Bars of New York, Missouri, and Washington, D.C. He received his J.D. from
Fordham Law School and his LL.M. in Corporate Law from NYU. He spent ten years with the
New York Stock Exchange Division of Enforcement, where he handled appeals before the NYSE
Board of Directors and the Securities and Exchange Commission. He is on the Board of Editors of
The Journal of Securities Law, Regulation & Compliance and has served as a securities industry
arbitrator since 2000. Professor Colesanti is presently teaching Securities Regulation for the
eleventh straight year. His writings have been published in securities industry journals, law
reviews, The New York Law Journal and The New York Business Law Journal, and as expert
commentaries to LexisNexis. He is a co-editor of the “Business Law Blog” at
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/. He wishes to thank Kristen A Truver, Hofstra
University School of Law, Class of 2011, for her research assistance.
1. See generally GILLIAN TETT, FOOL’S GOLD: HOW THE BOLD DREAM OF A SMALL TRIBE
AT J.P. MORGAN WAS CORRUPTED BY WALL STREET GREED AND UNLEASHED A CATASTROPHE
(2009) (detailing the origin, growth, and abuse of credit default swaps between 1994 and 2008).
2. See, e.g., James Surowiecki, Ratings Downgrade, NEW YORKER, Sept. 28, 2009, at 25
(noting President Obama’s “well-deserved shots at some of the villains of the financial crisis:
greedy bankers, reckless investors, and captive regulators” during a speech in New York the same
month).
3. See Jenny Anderson, As Goldman Thrives, Some Say an Ethos Fades, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
16, 2009, at A1 (reporting former partners’ words that while Goldman has always sought to
maximize profits, the bank used to take a longer term view).
4. Admissions by regulators of their lapses range from the generic to the pointed. See
Financial Regulatory Revision: Before the J. Economic Comm., 111th Cong. (2009) (unpublished
written testimony of Timothy F. Geithner, Secretary of the Department of the Treasury), available
at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg413.htm.
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which any one public sector can be blamed has, like the corresponding
remedies presently languishing in Congress, been seemingly postponed
until a consensus can be reached on the ultimate means of ending the
downturn.5 Moreover, such a direct allocation of culpability may just be a
condition precedent to our economy’s recovery. For example, the savings
and loan crisis of the late 1980’s, which led to the demise of over 1000
regional banks, arguably stopped short of a financial Armageddon because
Federal Judge Stanley Sporkin lambasted the accounting and legal
professions.6 The Stock Market Crash of 1987, which was over in less than
a month, was blamed on those gamblers known as ‘program traders,’ thus
resulting in new rules designed to shut down the stock exchanges when

In the years leading up to the crisis, our financial regulatory regime permitted an
excessive build-up of risk, both inside and outside of the traditional banking system.
The shock absorbers critical to preserving stability – capital, margin, and liquidity
cushions in particular – were inadequate. Outdated, ineffective regulation left our
system too weak to withstand the failure of major institutions.
Id.
Likewise, Federal Reserve Chairman, Benjamin Bernanke, recently stated “[s]tronger
regulation and supervision aimed at problems with underwriting practices and lenders’ risk
management would have been a more effective and surgical approach to constraining the housing
bubble than a general increase in interest rates.” Catherine Rampell, Lax Oversight Caused Crisis,
Bernanke Says, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2010, at A1; see also SEC OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN.,
Executive Summary to INVESTIGATION OF FAILURE OF THE SEC TO UNCOVER BERNARD
MADOFF’S PONZI SCHEME 1 (2009), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2009/oig-509-execsummary.pdf. (“[T]he SEC received more than ample information in the form of detailed and
substantive complaints over the years to warrant a thorough and comprehensive examination . . .
despite three examinations and two investigations being conducted, a thorough and competent
investigation or examination was never performed.”).
5. See, e.g., Sarah Kellogg, Financial Crisis 2008: Where Were the Lawyers?, WASH. LAW.,
Jan. 2010, at 20, available at http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/resources/publications/
washington_lawyer/january_2010/financial_crisis.cfm (“By most measures, the United States
remains in the grip of a prolonged financial crisis . . . . More than a year after the bottom fell out
of the U.S. economy, the masterminds on Wall Street and in Washington continue to struggle.”).
6. The full quote from Judge Sporkin reads as follows:
Where were these professionals, a number of whom are now asserting their rights
under the Fifth Amendment, when these clearly improper transactions were being
consummated?
Why didn’t any of them speak up or disassociate themselves from the transactions?
Where also were the outside accountants and attorneys when these transactions were
effectuated?
What is difficult to understand is that with all the professional talent involved (both
accounting and legal), why at least one professional would not have blown the whistle
to stop the overreaching that took place in this case.
Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 920 (D.D.C. 1990) (upholding the seizure
by the OTS of the Phoenician resort and affiliated thrift).
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daily trading swings proved too volatile.7 Meanwhile, the mortgage debt
crisis of the early ‘90s lost steam once the Orange County Treasurer went to
jail and counterparty firms paid unprecedented fines.8 Earlier this decade,
when a number of large corporations evidenced accounting irregularities,
specific company management was indicted, prompting a law that obligated
CEOs and CFOs to swear to the accuracy of financial statements.9
Mindful of the pressing need for such resolute finger-pointing, this
Article seeks to provide a cross-boundary analysis of the statutes,
initiatives, cases, agency decisions, and regulatory reporting lines that either
paved the way or aggravated the economic crisis of 2007–2010 (the Crisis).
Accordingly, this Article seeks to test postulates of blame in four distinct
categories: the enactments of the federal legislature, the decisions by the
federal judiciary, the mortgage policy of the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) (as steered by the White House), and the
actions/omissions by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or
Commission). To that end, this Article identifies the popular wisdom
concerning the culpability of each government sector, locates predating
trends in the underlying “law,” and compares the two for a variance. The
resulting five postulates are summarized as follows:


The perceptions of the Crisis’ causes are hindered by the search for
predicate actions in the past five years, while the true origins of the
Crisis seem to be rooted in decades past.



The more that a perception focuses on an investment product, the less
illustrative the critique.



The contributions to the Crisis by the judiciary and White House
during its genesis period are, to one degree or another, understated.



The ultimate causes for the Crisis may be more subtle and
atmospheric than direct and empirical.



Not only have the laws governing the contributors to the Crisis grown
outdated, so has our collective ability to levy blame. Until we
recognize that the nightmare scenario of Wall Streeters victimizing
the commoner has been supplanted by more complex wrongs, the
corresponding analysis will continue to stagger and fall short.

In sum, unlike studies of prior financial crises, the clearest (and least
self-serving) reconstructions of the most recent catastrophe have been
undertaken by the financial press. This Article seeks to put such populist
perceptions to the legal test. Owing homage to the existing literature
7. See NYSE, Inc., Dealings and Settlements, Rule 80B (Trading Halts Due to Extraordinary
Market Volatility) (1998), available at http://rules.nyse.com/NYSETools/PlatformViewer.asp?
searched=1&selectednode=chp_1_3_4_20&CiRestriction=80B&manual=/nyse/rules/nyse-rules/.
8. See State v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 459 S.E.2d 906, 910–13 (W. Va. 1995).
9. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 404, 15 U.S.C. §7262 (Supp. 2002).

178

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 4

confirming the sins of over-exotic products and profligate spending, this
Article eschews any focus on private actors (e.g., credit rating agencies) in
favor of examination of government accelerants and responses (much in the
same way that a scrutiny of gaming laws confesses the existence of
gambling but refuses to blame the horses or dice). Overall, this Article
hopes to contribute to academia a categorical assessment of the service
offered by the public servants collectively charged with maintaining the
first line defense against the very economic abyss that continues to threaten
both national and international markets. Stated otherwise, one should be
forced to see how meltdowns and bailouts are made, if only to prevent their
frequent recurrence.
I. THE POPULIST VIEW ON THE ORIGINS OF THE CRISIS
Although it has become politically expedient to characterize the
prolonged economic slump as unforeseeable, in fact, nothing could be
further from the truth. It is the position of this Article that in government,
industry, and academia, the warning signs were almost as pronounced and
as old as the seeds of the crisis themselves. Perhaps, when the fear of
inviting blame has subsided, all parties will accede to this simple truth.
A. RELEVANT TIMELINE FOR THE ANALYSIS OF THE SUBPRIME
MELTDOWN
Wall Street possesses a time-honored affection for novel investment
vehicles. While individual residential mortgage loans are insignificant to
investment bankers, during the relevant years, these mortgages were
bundled and sold, about half of the time, to entities known as “government
sponsored enterprises” (GSEs) such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.10 The
purchases of securitized bundles by GSEs, often called Collateralized Debt
Obligations (CDOs)11 grew rapidly,12 from $81 billion of such securities in
2003 to $169 billion in 2005.13

10 See Zachary A. Goldfarb & David Cho, U.S. Considers Remaking Mortgage Giants,
WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 2009, at A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/08/05/AR2009080504063.html; see also Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation Act of 1970, tit. III, Pub. L. No. 91-351, 84 Stat. 451 (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. §§ 1451–1459 (2006)) (chartering Freddie Mac as a GSE in 1970); Federal National
Mortgage Association Charter Act of 1956, ch. 649, tit. II, § 201, 68 Stat. 612 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1717) (chartering Fannie Mae as a GSE in 1968).
11. See infra notes 151, 152.
12. See, e.g., SEC Actions Relating to the Financial Crisis: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Financial Servs. and General Government Operations of the Comm. on Appropriations, 111th
Cong. 249 (2009) [hereinafter Schapiro Testimony] (forthcoming testimony of Mary Schapiro,
Chairman of the SEC), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2009/ts031109mls.htm.
13. Carol D. Leonnig, How HUD Mortgage Policy Fed the Crisis: Subprime Loans Labeled
‘Affordable,’ WASH. POST, June 10, 2008, at A1.
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The Federal Reserve helped spur the growth of the exotic investments.
The Federal Funds rate was lowered to 1% and kept there throughout the
2004 fiscal year.14 This prompted lenders to make loans, and to disregard
vague suitability guidelines.15 In turn, the entities that bought these loans
shot right past all rational limits on their purchasing ability.16 The result was
a dramatic increase in a risky category of debt known as “subprime
lending,” which represented just 8.6% of all mortgage debt in 2001 but rose
to over 20% in 2006.17
The growth was also attributable in part to academic hubris. In 2003, a
University of Chicago professor and winner of a Nobel Prize in Economics,
haughtily declared that the “central problem of depression-prevention has
been solved, for all practical purposes.”18 Ultimately, radical credit became
the must game in town. The now defunct Lehman Brothers ratcheted up its
debt to leverage ratio from twenty-five times equity to thirty-five times
equity in one year.19 Surprisingly, instead of inviting scorn, its model
became the standard to which large firms aspired.20 CEOs quickly learned
that, regardless of their intuition, unfettered faith in the upswing of the real
estate market was the only course of action if they intended to prove their
competitive entrepreneurialism to corporate boards.21
B. DRAMATIC ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE WELL-HEELED
In an era characterized by the free flow of money, significant eyes took
heed. In 2005, insurance giant AIG stopped underwriting CDOs.22 In 2006,
14. James Grant, Weekend Journal: Why No Outrage?, WALL ST. J., July 19, 2008, at W1.

15. Edmund L. Andrews, Fed and Regulators Shrugged as the Subprime Crisis Spread, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 18, 2007, at A1 (“The Fed helped stoke the housing market by slashing short-term
interest rates from 2000 to 2004. The rate cuts drastically reduced the effective cost of buying a
house, which added more fuel to what was already a powerful housing boom.”).
16. Joseph A. Giannone, Lehman Leverage Still Too High: Einhorn, REUTERS, June 9, 2008,
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN09178720080609.
17. John Cassidy, Subprime Suspect: Annals of Business, NEW YORKER, Mar. 31, 2008, at 78.
18. PAUL KRUGMAN, THE RETURN OF DEPRESSION ERA ECONOMICS AND THE CRISIS OF
2008 9 (2009) (elaborating that the professor was not claiming that the “irregular alternation of
recessions and expansions” was over, but rather that efforts were better expended in studying
“long-term economic growth”).
19. WILLIAM D. COHAN, HOUSE OF CARDS: A TALE OF HUBRIS AND WRETCHED EXCESS ON
WALL STREET 3 (2009).
20. See Devin Leonard, How Lehman Brothers Got its Real Estate Fix, N.Y. TIMES, May 3,
2009, at BU1 (citing the comment of one noted analyst that “a lot of Wall Street firms tried to
duplicate Lehman’s commercial real estate strategy”).
21. See, e.g., The Balance Sheet, http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/jamessurowiecki
/2009/01/who-saw-the-dan.html (Jan. 6, 2009) (noting the July 2007 comment by the Citigroup
CEO that “as long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance.”); see also ANDREW
ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW WALL STREET AND WASHINGTON
FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM FROM CRISIS—AND THEMSELVES 14 (2009) (“[L]ike
everyone else on Wall Street, [Lehman Brothers CEO Richard Fuld] couldn’t pass up the
opportunities.”).
22. See Cassidy, supra note 17.
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the Consumer Federation of America published its famed report, Exotic or
Toxic: An Examination of the Non-Traditional Mortgage Market for
Consumers and Lenders.23 In February 2007, HSBC, an international
banking giant, announced that it was reserving $10 billion to cover nonperforming American mortgages.24 The next month, the burgeoning
scrutiny of bank regulators prompted Senator Christopher Dodd to send
letters to Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke and other officials
decrying lagging supervision of subprime lenders.25
In March 2007, The Wall Street Journal openly questioned whether
federal regulators were to blame in the disastrous expansion in subprime
lending.26 In June 2007, a “seismic quiver” shot up the spine of Wall Street
when it was disclosed that two Bear Stearns mortgage hedge funds could
not meet margin calls.27 In September 2007, former Federal Reserve
Chairman Alan Greenspan blandly confessed nearly two months of market
turmoil, noting that “[t]he human race has never found a way to confront
[stock market] bubbles.”28 Regardless, that month, the dire news appeared
in full swing, as a former Federal Reserve Governor turned author reminded
the public that he foretold that the “predictable result” of the residential real
estate boom was “carnage.”29
C. REGULATORY NOTICE
By the end of the summer of 2007, the brokerage industry’s chief
regulator put firms on notice that sales of “complex structure products”
such as mortgage-related securities would be expressly examined.30 The
catastrophe became a bit more public in the fall, as more storied Wall Street
firms admitted their bad bets.31 Shortly before Halloween, Merrill Lynch
23. ALLEN J. FISHBEIN & PATRICK WOODALL, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., EXOTIC OR TOXIC?
AN EXAMINATION OF THE NON-TRADITIONAL MORTGAGE MARKET FOR CONSUMERS AND
LENDERS (2006), http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/Exotic_Toxic_Mortgage_Report0506.pdf.
24. Cassidy, supra note 17.
25. Greg Ip & Damian Paletta, Lending Oversight: Regulators Scrutinized in Mortgage
Meltdown; States, Federal Agencies Clashed on Subprimes as Market Ballooned, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 22, 2007, at A1 (Senator Dodd wrote in a letter to regulators that “‘the crisis has been in the
making for several years, and, in my view, it has taken far too long for the regulators to act.’”).
26. Id.
27. CHARLES R. MORRIS, Forward to THE TRILLION DOLLAR MELTDOWN: EASY MONEY,
HIGH ROLLERS, AND THE GREAT CREDIT CRASH, at ix–xviii (2008).
28. Greg Ip, Credit Crunch: Greenspan Says Turmoil Fits Pattern, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 2007,
at C2, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118913318976220324.html.
29. Greg Ip & Stephen Miller, Remembrances, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 2007, at A6 (describing
the prophecies of Edward Gramlich, who had died days earlier, and his prescient book, Subprime
Mortgages: America’s Latest Boom and Bust, which was published in June 2007).
30. FINRA, REGULATORY NOTICE 07-43 (2007), http://www.finra.org/web/groups/rules_regs/
documents/notice_to_members/p036816.pdf.
31. Susan Pulliam & Kara Scanell, Pricing Probes on Wall Street Gather Steam: SEC-Led
Investigations Focus on Public Notice, In-House Discrepancies, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 2007, at
C1.
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reported its first quarterly loss in nearly six years based upon a write-down
of nearly $8 billion.32
In December 2007, the SEC and other regulators were said to be
investigating brokerages regarding the pricing of mortgage securities and
the need for public disclosure of their rapidly declining prices.33 In the
presence of $80 billion in write-downs in the last few months of the year,
the Commission was said to have initiated three dozen investigations.34
However, such parries were usually tempered by uncertainties. For
example, since the securities in question were difficult to accurately value,
an SEC official was concurrently quoted as stating, “We don’t know now
that we will be recommending any enforcement actions in the subprime
area.”35
Private watchdogs were less equivocal. In March 2008, a full six
months before the newspapers publicized the onset of the Crisis, an
investment advisor running a consumer friendly website posted the warning
that “[t]he great credit unwind is upon us. Credit default swaps on all
brokers, particularly Lehman [Brothers] and Bear Stearns, are blowing out,
big time.”36
D. COSTLY STARTS AND STOPS, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
Particularly disconcerting throughout 2008 were the unhalting trends,
unfathomable losses, and unpunished errors. In late January 2008, Merrill
Lynch, which had written down $10 billion of mortgage-related securities,
disclosed its intent to abandon the structured credit business.37 The same
month, New York’s Attorney General Andrew Cuomo directed his staff to
issue subpoenas and utilize the broad Martin Act to examine whether bigname firms failed to disclose risks to customers.38 Yet again there was
trepidation, as the sources for the story concurrently cited unrealistic credit
firm ratings, thus undermining a direct link to investor harm.39
In Spring 2008, it was reported that “6.35% of all mortgages were at
least 30 days delinquent, not including those already in foreclosure.”40 The
32. Jenny Anderson & Landon Thomas Jr., Loss and Larger Write-Down at Merrill, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 24, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/24/business/24merrillweb.html.
33. Pulliam & Scanell, supra note 31.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. COHAN, supra note 19. “Lehman reportedly has two times [its] capital in [commercial
mortgage backed securities].” Id. at 11.
37. Shanny Basar, Thain Declares Structured Credit Exit, FIN. NEWS ONLINE, Jan. 31, 2008,
http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2008-01-31/thain-declares-structured-credit-exit.
38. Kate Kelly et al., State Subprime Probe Takes a New Track, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2008, at
A3.
39. Id.
40. Michael Corkery et al., Real-Estate Woes of Banks Mount; Lenders Dumping Bad Loans at
Discount; Regulators See Losses Continuing, WALL ST. J., June 6, 2008, at A1.
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next month, Merrill Lynch suffered its fourth consecutive quarterly loss,
writing off another $9.75 billion in assets and bringing its overall writedowns for the year to $43 billion.41 Separately, banks worldwide reported
write-downs of $335 billion.42
The mammoth numbers, at times, seemed to eclipse the severity of the
official observations. In May 2008, it was disclosed without fanfare by then
SEC Chairman Christopher Cox that regulators had “discovered a host of
perverse incentives in the securiti[z]ation process.”43 The confusion and
pain were hardly reserved for the stock market. While approximately 1.3
million residential foreclosures took place in 2007,44 by the second quarter
of 2008, such statistics were up 121%, and it was estimated that 1 out of
every 171 homes was in foreclosure.45
While the Dow Jones Industrial Average continued to exhibit a
remarkably consistent fall (ultimately shrinking approximately 40% in
2008),46 more entities reevaluated their holdings, leading to further writedowns.47 Tallies of losses at Citibank and Merrill Lynch reached over $80
billion by mid-2008.48 Simultaneously, the Treasury and the Federal
Reserve combined forces to prop up the two GSEs owning half of the
mortgages in the country.49 In October 2008, Congress passed a first bailout
(valued at $700 billion),50 and the government rescued Freddie Mac and
Fannie Mae51 while providing more directed relief to insurance behemoth
41.
42.
43.
44.

Write-downs Put Merrill Lynch in Red, CHI. TRIB., July 18, 2008, at 3.
Leaders: Barbarians at the Vault, ECONOMIST, May 17, 2008, at 15.
Joanna Chung, SEC Looks to Subprime Lessons, FIN. TIMES, May 23, 2008, at 15.
Number of Foreclosures Soared in 2007, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 29, 2008, available at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22893703/.
45. Press Release, RealtyTrac.com, Foreclosure Activity Up 14 Percent in Second Quarter
(July 25, 2008), http://www.realtytrac.com/ContentManagement/pressrelease.aspx?Channel
ID=9&ItemID=4891.
46. Yahoo! Finance, Historical Prices for the Dow Jones Industrial Average,
http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=^DJI&a=11&b=31&c=2007&d=11&e=31&f=2008&g=d (last
visited Mar. 11, 2010) (detailing the daily drop in the DJIA closing price between Dec. 31, 2007
(13,264) and Dec. 31, 2008 (8,668)).
47. Michael M. Grynbaum, New Worries About Credit Drive Down Stock Markets, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 20, 2007, at C1.
48. Jon Hilsenrath, Markets Police Themselves Poorly, But Regulation Has Its Flaws, WALL
ST. J., July 21, 2008, at A2.
49. Stephen Labaton & Edmund L. Andrews, In Rescue to Stabilize Lending, U.S. Takes Over
Mortgage Finance Titans, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2008, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/08/business/08fannie.html.
50. See generally Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-343, 122 Stat.
3765 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) (establishing the Troubled Assets
Relief Program).
51. Peter J. Wallison & Charles W. Calomiris, The Last Trillion-Dollar Commitment: The
Destruction of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, FIN. SERVICES OUTLOOK (Am. Enter. Inst. for Pub.
Policy Research, Washington, D.C.), Sept. 2008, at 1, http://www.aei.org/docLib/200809
30_Binder1.pdf; see also Daniel Gross, Saving the People’s Bank of China: Who the Fannie
Mae/Freddie Mac Bailout is Really Supposed to Help, SLATE, Sept. 8, 2008,
http://www.slate.com/id/2199564.
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AIG, amounting to $75 billion.52 In February 2009, Congress provided a
second, generalized bailout (valued at $787 billion).53
Ultimately, observers, regardless of political dispositions, agreed on the
unprecedented myopia in the economic sector that jeopardized a nation.54
However, outspoken interests comprehended ahead of time that, when it
came to exotic investments and the new derivatives designed to hedge bets
thereon, there was much that was dangerously underestimated.55 In sum, the
Crisis was created due to reckless behavior by its architects, had predictable
effects, and started with an inordinate amount of attention (and financing)
being paid to residential homeowners.
II. WHITE HOUSE HOUSING POLICY: RARELY HAVE SO FEW
CONTRIBUTED SO MUCH
A. PERCEPTION
Early in the Crisis, the press highlighted the previous decision by HUD
to require GSEs to purchase more loans made to subprime borrowers.56
That perception posits that the GSEs, ignoring the time-honored dictate of
Keynesian economics that there is no true liquidity for markets on the
whole,57 contemplated an ever-increasing source of demand (for both
homes and CDOs).58 They were drastically wrong. By late 2009, the public
appeared to overwhelming favor a close, watchful eye over the agencies
that both prompted the Crisis and later cost so much to prop up.59

52. Mary Williams Walsh & Michael J. de la Merced, A Race For Cash at A.I.G., N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 16, 2008, at C1; see also Gretchen Morgenson, Behind Insurer’s Crisis, A Blind Eye to a
Web of Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2008, at A1.
53. See Economic Stimulus, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/
subjects/u/united_states_economy/economic_stimulus/index.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2010)
(referencing the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat.
115 (2009)).
54. See, e.g., Laurence Grafstein, The Real Banker Boondoggle, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 23,
2009, at 23, 22–23. “[W]e can acknowledge that every major commercial and investment bank in
the United States faced a direct threat to its insolvency arising from (a) its level of leverage, (b) its
interrelationships with other leveraged institutions—‘counterparties’—and (c) its reliance on
short-term funding from those counterparties.” Id. at 22.
55. Ip & Miller, supra note 29.
56. Leonnig, supra note 13.
57. “[T]here is no such thing as liquidity of investment for the community as a whole.” John
Cassidy, Rational Irrationality; Annals of Economics, NEW YORKER, Oct. 5, 2009, at 32 (quoting
JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY 139
(Atl. Publishers & Distrib. 2006) (1964)).
58. Greg Ip, His Legacy Tarnished, Greenspan Goes on Defensive; Future of U.S. Financial
Reform Is at Stake; ‘I Am Right,’ WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 2008, at A1.
59. See Nick Timiraos, U.S. News: Support Grows for Fan-Fred Plan: Proposals to Reshape
Mortgage Firms Call for Retaining Public-Private Structure, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2009, at A7
(“A consensus appears to be growing among academics, investors and housing experts that the
federal government should retain a role in the U.S. mortgage market over the long term . . . .”).
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B. DETAILS
Upon closer inspection, the ground floor of the baleful “own a home at
no cost” strategy had been built by the White House about fifteen years
before.60 Thereafter, a trifecta of U.S. Chief Executives, from both parties,
consistently combined to lower the financial thresholds to home
ownership.61
In November 1990, President George H.W. Bush signed the CranstonGonzalez National Affordable Housing Act (NAHA) designed to, among
other things, provide federal assistance to the planning and financing of
conversions of public housing projects from private rental to ownership.62
Among other things, NAHA:
(1) proposed a $25.5 billion budget for HUD in 1992;63
(2) established a “National Homeownership Trust” within HUD to
provide assistance for first time buyers;64
(3) permitted HUD mortgage insurance up to 98.7% of the
appraised value of the property;65 and
(4) made permanent the maximum single family mortgage loan
limit of $124,875.66
Symbolically, NAHA signaled the start of nearly two decades of
assistance for those who failed to meet traditional minimal requirements for
mortgages:
[NAHA] puts power in the hands of people. First, it authorizes a major
administration initiative: Homeownership and Opportunity for People
Everywhere, the HOPE Initiative. HOPE will provide new opportunities
for low-income families to buy their own homes—urban homesteaders, if
you will—and helps the residents of public housing to buy their own units.

60. Leonnig, supra note 13; see also Ann Mariano, Panel Rejects Housing Money Transfer;
Kemp Requested Funds for HUD’s Ownership, Rental Initiatives, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 1991, at
A7.
61. Leonnig, supra note 13.
62. Id.
63. Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act (NAHA) § 323, Pub. L. No. 101625, 104 Stat. 4079 (1990) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1709 (b)(2) (2006)).
64. NAHA § 302 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12851 (2006)).
65. NAHA § 324 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1709(b)(2) (2006)).
66. See generally NAHA, tit. III (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 and 42
U.S.C.).
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Tenant management, control and, ultimately, ownership of public housing
is an idea whose time has come.67

Several years later, the torch was relayed by President Clinton’s
“National Homeownership Strategy.”68 The National Homeownership
Strategy “loosened mortgage restrictions” for first time buyers by insuring
loans, eliminating the requirements that borrowers either prove prolonged
stable income or be interviewed in person, and allowing lenders to hire their
own appraisers,69 thus creating the potential for inflated valuations. The
ensuing tactics, which utilized such measures from the 1970s as the
Community Reinvestment Act70 and the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act,71
furthered these goals by, respectively, encouraging banks to lend to
formerly ineligible customers and penalizing/fining banks that refused to
lower credit standards.72 Subsequently, in 1995, President Clinton
acquiesced to guidelines that would allow GSEs to receive credit for buying
“subprime” securities as packaged products of loans creating affordable
housing.73
Then in 2003, President George W. Bush signed the Zero-Down
Payment Act.74 Addressing the needs of first time buyers of single family
dwellings, this law authorized $200 million in assistance with down
payments. The results were dramatic: By 2007, 29% of home mortgages
were estimated as originating with absolutely no down payment.75
Additionally, in 2004, HUD guidelines were made even more favorable
to financially challenged homeowners and purchases rose dramatically.76
Between 2004 and 2006, GSEs purchased $434 billion in securities backed
by subprime loans.77 In hindsight, these guidelines served merely as
frightening yardsticks, as neither HUD nor the GSEs possessed the
capability of filtering the underlying CDO loan data to inspect individual
loans.78

67. See George Bush, XLI President of the United States, Remarks on Signing the CranstonGonzalez National Affordable Housing Act (Nov. 28, 1990), available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=19101.
68. See Eamonn K. Moran, Wall Street Meets Main Street: Understanding the Financial
Crisis, 13 N.C. BANK INST. 5, 25–26 (2009).
69. Id.
70. Community Reinvestment Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901–2906 (2006).
71. Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801–2811 (2006).
72. Moran, supra note 68, at 26–28.
73. Leonnig, supra note 13; see also Moran, supra note 68, at 28.
74. Zero Downpayment Act of 2004, H.R. 3755, 108th Cong. (2004).
75. Moran, supra note 68, at 30.
76. Leonnig, supra note 13.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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C. COMMENTARY
Despite the persistent attempts by the press and others to pigeonhole the
Crisis as the result of overreaching homeowners,79 it seems facile to link
foreclosure statistics to any burgeoning, disastrous desire for upward
mobility. Reliance upon credit had been the hallmark of the middle class for
decades, and the last eight years arguably adhered to this discernible trend.80
Between 2002 and 2007, credit card debt in this country increased over
20%.81 Between 2002 and 2005, personal bankruptcies shot up about 32%,82
and only ceased its upward trend because of changes in federal law that
made bankruptcy discharges more difficult.83 By 2008, the length of an
average car loan was often extended beyond six years, as buyers saddled
themselves with additional payments and interest.84
More on point, the decision to employ HUD as the financier of, and
repository for, new, untested mortgage-related products far predated any
watershed presidential choice in or around 2004.85 More significantly, to
order agencies into lesser standards may be politically popular, but from a
regulatory standpoint, such moves risk disjointed implementation and
unprepared supervision. For example, banking regulation is notoriously
fragmented, with no less than five federal entities sharing duties of setting
policy, overseeing operations, and enforcing statutes and rules.86 The
collective presumption that these fiefdoms would maintain order during the
prolonged festival thus proved fatal.
D. A MILLION NEW GUNS IN A TOWN WITHOUT A SHERIFF
The notion of the Federal Reserve as a strong banking regulator is
misplaced. History recalls the system as originating to preserve banks (as
79. See, e.g., Robert Holmes, Who’s to Blame for the Economy? Homeowners,
THESTREET.COM, Mar. 11, 2009, http://www.thestreet.com/story/10470251/whos-to-blame-forthe-economy-homeowners.html.
80. Stacy Johnson, A Chance to Learn from the “Greatest Generation,” ATL. J.
CONSTITUTION, Feb. 25, 2010, at A17.
81. Press Release, Credit.com, Five Shocking Credit Card Debt Statistics,
http://www.credit.com/credit_information/debt_help/Five-Shocking-Credit-Card-DebtStatistics.
jsp (last visited Feb. 20, 2010).
82. See ABI World, Annual Business and Non-business Filings by Year (1980–2008),
http://www.abiworld.org/AM/AMTemplate.cfm?Section=Home&CONTENTID=57826&TEMPL
ATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm (last visited Mar. 31, 2010).
83. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8,
119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.).
84. See Mellody Hobson, Recession Rescue: Tackle Your Auto Loan Debt, ABCNEWS.COM,
Feb. 26, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/MellodyHobson/story?id=4170624&page=1.
85. See Morgenson, supra note 52.
86. See SEC, Banking Regulators, http://www.sec.gov/answers/bankreg.htm (last visited Feb.
20, 2010) (listing the five federal banking regulators); see also COHAN, supra note 19, at 19–20,
49–50 (detailing the role of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency in attempting to discern
the financial condition of Bear Stearns in March 2008 and describing the concurrent efforts of the
Federal Reserve and the SEC to obtain the same information).
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J.P. Morgan himself had done in the Panic of 1907) and continuing as
guarantor of the “elevated risk” game.87 The Federal Reserve system is
notoriously fragmented, comprised of twelve regional Federal banks,
which, per the Banking Act of 1913, have nine member boards made up of
leaders in the private sector.88 It is safe to say that the system was designed
foremost to buoy mortgagees, a goal that is assisted by other federal
regulators and their regional subdivisions who, in unison, work to facilitate
credit to banks.89 For example, in the summer of 2007, it was the Atlanta
Federal Home Loan Bank Board that extended its line of credit to
Countrywide Financial to the tune of $22 billion. From 2003 to the third
quarter of 2007, Countrywide’s SEC filings disclosed that its operating cash
flow deficits were a cumulative $38 billion, mostly financed from federal
loans.90 Moreover, the Federal Reserve and Office of Thrift Supervision
(OTS), two of the larger bank regulators, rarely bring disciplinary actions
and were reportedly encouraged by the George W. Bush Administration to
focus on growth.91 Indeed, the effectiveness of the Federal Reserve serving
in any role as a regulator has been openly questioned.92
The traditional governmental fragmentation and multiple purposes of
those fragmented parts resulted in the opportunistic new residential
mortgaging business lines falling across one, several, or no lines of federal
supervision. As The Wall Street Journal reported:
In 2005, 52% of subprime mortgages were originated by companies with
no federal supervision, primarily mortgage brokers and stand alone
finance companies. Another 25% were made by finance companies that
are units of bank holding companies and thus indirectly supervised by the
Federal Reserve, and 23% by regulated banks and thrifts.93

87. Peter Boone & Simon Johnson, The Next Financial Crisis, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 23, 2009,
at 24.

88. Sudeep Reddy, Fed Tightens Rules on Regional Directors, WALL ST. J., Nov. 27, 2009, at
A6.

89. Eric Dash, New Worries for Next Tier of Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2009, at B1; Eric
Dash, Four Major Banks Tap Federal Reserve for Financing, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2007, at C10.
90. MORRIS, supra note 27, at 154.
91. Ip & Paletta, supra note 25.
Regulators appointed by President Bush often have been more sympathetic to industry
concerns about red tape than their Clinton administration predecessors. When James
Gilleran, a former California banker and bank supervisor, took over the OTS in
December 2001, he became known for his deregulatory zeal. At one press event in
2003, several bank regulators held gardening shears to represent their commitment to
cut red tape for the industry. Mr. Gilleran brought a chain saw.
Id.

92. See KRUGMAN, supra note 18, at 172–74 (“The Fed is set up to do two main things:
manage interest rates and, when necessary, provide cash to banks.”).
93. Ip & Paletta, supra note 25.
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A more granular examination of the government’s liberalized home
lending programs perhaps only clouds the issue of detecting the precise
problem years. HUD statistics for New York households between 1998 and
2008 disclose that assistance to family households of “very low income”
increased 5% to 6% percent annually during the decade, with the exception
of 11% in the year 2006,94 a full three years after the passage of the ZeroDown Payment Act. What does seem readily apparent is that, starting in
1990, HUD’s coffers had been generously opened, leading generically to
alternative terms of financing and specifically to a nation of home loan
intermediaries actively seeking a plethora of mortgagors.95 Not surprisingly,
home ownership among the lower income households soared.
The point to be stressed is that various presidents in the last twenty
years wielded the power of promising homes to the tenant masses.96 The
more complex notion that investment professionals could turn this wellmeaning refrain into lucrative portfolios seemingly separated from those
home loans would, of course, need the support of more than just an elected
official with a potentially short tenure. Thus, the more exacting study may
center on the jurists who, during the key years preceding the crisis, helped
to formally signal that Washington, D.C. was a friend and not a foe to
expansive notions of capitalism.
III. THE JUDICIARY: SOMETHING IN THE AIR . . .
Scant attention has been paid to the role of the federal judiciary in the
nation’s current economic woes. While commentators occasionally noted
the difficulty in reaching employers and third parties under the Supreme
Court’s holding in the Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta,
Inc. case,97 overall, cases from last decade affecting the duties of corporate
America have largely escaped scrutiny in the national soul-searching that
continues into 2010.
To be sure, the aggressively speculative economy, laid bare in late
2008, neither arose in a season nor originated because of one discreet cause.
While it may be impossible to delineate the extent to which such an
economy takes direction from the courts, what does seem apparent is that
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, a critical federal bench, sounded a series
94. See U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. (HUD), HOME Program Income Limits (1998–
2008), available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/affordablehousing/programs/home/limits/
income/index.cfm (last visited Mar. 31, 2010). The figures were arrived at through analysis of the
varying assistance totals for the 4-person home in New York during the decade. Id.
95. Leonnig, supra note 13.
96. See supra notes 60–95 and accompanying text.
97. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 166–67 (2008)
(holding that aiders and abettors could not be held liable as secondary actors in private securities
fraud cases brought under Rule 10b-5). This decision essentially reaffirmed the Court’s holding
nearly 15 years prior in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164,
191 (1994).
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of harmonious notes in the laissez-faire symphony between the years 2003
and 2008.98
A. BACKGROUND – SOME NEW LIMITS ON AN OLD FRIEND TO
INVESTORS
In July 2003, a number of securities class actions simultaneously met
their dismissal in the District Court for the Southern District of New York.99
Riding on the tail of the monumental “Global Settlement” concluded by
then New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, the actions sought damages
from highly compensated brokerage firm analysts accused of tainting their
research in favor of issuers sought by firms.100 The Southern District of
New York’s decision rested upon a strict reading of privity, essentially
holding that an analyst could not be liable to a stranger.101 The decision
marked a new period of strict construction for SEC Rule 10b-5,102 the
elastic anti-fraud prohibition outlawing everything from internet securities
fraud to insider trading.
The Supreme Court took up the cause of limiting Rule 10b-5 via a
number of key decisions between 2005 and 2008. In Dura
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, the Court limited the types of defendants
that could be sued in securities class actions.103 In Merrill Lynch v. Dabit,104
the Court broke with precedent in accepting a broad definition of securities
“purchaser” for purposes of removing a class action against Merrill Lynch
to federal court where it could more readily be dismissed under the Uniform
Standards Act of 1998.105 As previously noted, also in 2008, the Supreme
Court precluded “scheme liability” in private securities actions based upon
Rule 10b-5 in Stoneridge.106
Apart from constrictive interpretations of securities fraud cases, the
Supreme Court also helped to conserve business assets by limiting
penalties. Specifically, in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, the Court
98. Fin. Planning Ass’n v. SEC, 482 F.3d 481 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d
873 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
99. See, e.g., In re Merrill Lynch & Co. Research Rep. Sec. Litig., 272 F. Supp. 2d 243
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (dismissing a securities class action against Merrill Lynch); Pfeiffer v. Goldman
Sachs & Co., No. 02 Civ. 6912-HB, 2003 WL 21505876, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2003)
(dismissing a class action suit against Goldman Sachs, Credit Suisse, and Morgan Stanley).
100. See Landon Thomas Jr., Judges Reject Suits Blaming Analysts for Losses, N.Y. TIMES,
July 2, 2003, at C1.
101. See In re Merrill Lynch Co. Research Rep. Sec. Litig., 272 F. Supp. 2d at 262 (“Merrill
Lynch and the Fund are not the insurers of Plaintiff’s investment in a highly speculative sector of
the market where the omissions complained of are not adequately alleged to have been the
proximate cause of the loss.”).
102. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2008) (“Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices”).
103. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005).
104. Merrill Lynch v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 85 (2006).
105. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2006)).
106. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 159–60 (2008).
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drastically reduced punitive damages in the longstanding dispute over the
oil company’s devastating spill in Alaska.107 Most noteworthy, successful
attacks in the D.C. Circuit on the very authority of the SEC to demarcate
lines of corporate responsibility put the Commission’s legislative authority
under slow but consistent siege.108
B. THE LIMITS ON SEC RULEMAKING
A closer inspection of the decisions of three key circuits within the last
decade reveals a curious about-face in a region traditionally favoring
regulation. Specifically, while cordial deference to Commission rulemaking
has been consistently exhibited in the Second109 and Ninth Circuits,110 in the
Goldstein v. SEC (2006),111 Chamber of Commerce v. SEC (2006),112 and
Financial Planners v. SEC (2007)113 decisions, the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals dealt rare victories to market voices challenging SEC hegemony.
In fact, these unrelated, but equally bold rulings, can be said to have both
tilted the battle for business opposition to regulation and helped create the
excessively entrepreneurial philosophy now blamed for Wall Street’s
myopic risk-taking.
1. Goldstein (2006)
In late 2004, the SEC announced its “hedge fund rule,” which required
advisers to hedge funds with (1) $30 million in assets and (2) fifteen or
more investors, to register with the Commission.114 Thus, this Rule would
have the effect of bringing subject hedge funds onto the SEC radar
screen.115 The Rule, which had been passed on a 3-2, partisan vote among
107. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2634 (2008).
108. Fin. Planning Ass’n v. SEC, 482 F.3d 481 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d
873 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
109. See, e.g., Schiller v. Tower Semiconductor Ltd., 449 F.3d 286, 302 (2d Cir. 2006)
(upholding SEC Rule 3a12-3 by finding that Commission notices and the rule itself satisfied the
required “adequate statement of basis and purpose” set forth by § 553 of the Administrative
Procedure Act); Gryl ex rel. Shire Pharms. Group PLC v. Shire Pharms. Group PLD, 298 F.3d
136, 145 (2d Cir. 2002) (“[W]e must defer to the SEC’s interpretations of its own regulations in its
amicus briefs unless they are plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulations.”); United
States v. Cusimano, 123 F.3d 83, 88 (2d Cir. 1997) ([W]e note that in O’Hagan the Supreme
Court held, as this Court had held previously, that [SEC] Rule 14e-3 was a valid exercise of the
SEC’s rulemaking authority.”) (citation omitted)).
110. See, e.g., Dreiling v. Am. Express Co., 458 F.3d 942, 949 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding the
creation of SEC Rule 16b-3(d), setting forth three exemptions from the Securities Exchange Act
Section 16(b) reporting requirements, was a similar valid exercise); Meyers v. Merrill Lynch &
Co., 249 F.3d 1087, 1088 (9th Cir. 2001) (upholding Regulation M as a proper exercise of SEC
rulemaking authority).
111. Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 884.
112. Chamber of Commerce, 443 F.3d at 909.
113. Fin. Planning Ass’n, 482 F.3d 481.
114. See Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 2333, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054 (Dec. 10, 2004).
115. See id.
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SEC Commissioners,116 centered on an expanded definition of “clients”
advised by the firm. Traditionally, if the number of such clients (or groups
of clients) was fifteen or less, no registration was required.117 Petitioners, a
hedge fund and investment firm, took issue with the new definition, and the
D.C. Circuit Court agreed.118
The D.C. Circuit Court’s criticisms of the SEC stance ranged widely.
Noting that the term “hedge fund” had never been adequately defined,119
and that the Rule appeared to be a direct response to the press generated by
the failure of notorious Long-Term Capital management,120 the court
suggested that the SEC, by seeking to compel registration of individuals
affiliated with entities traditionally exempted by both the Investment
Advisers Act (IA Act) and the Investment Company Act, had departed from
the statutes.121
Additionally, the court’s analysis seized upon the comments of the two
SEC dissenters to the Rule’s adoption.122 Ultimately finding the hedge fund
rule to be capricious, the court concluded that the, “Commission’s rule
creates a situation in which funds with one hundred or fewer investors are
exempt from the more demanding Investment Company Act, but those with
fifteen or more investors trigger registration under the [IA] Act. This is an
arbitrary rule.”123
The unanimous court thus struck down the hedge fund rule more than
eighteen months after its issuance,124 leaving those hedge funds that had
duly registered with the option of continued registered status.125 More
globally, a trillion dollar industry which had been publicly faulted for a lack
of supervision,126 was left unsure of regulatory expectations either at the
government or customer level.

116.
117.
118.
119.

See id. at 72,089 (Comm’rs Glassman and Atkins, dissenting).
See id. at 72,054.
Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 874–76 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
Id. at 874–75 (“The term appears nowhere in the federal securities laws, and even industry
participants do not agree upon a single definition.”).
120. Id. at 877.
121. Id. at 875–77; see also Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80(a)-6(a)(5)(A)(iii) (2006);
Investment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(C) (2006).
122. Goldstein, 451 F.3d. at 878.
123. Id. at 884.
124. Id.
125. See Floyd Norris, Court Says S.E.C. Lacks Authority on Hedge Funds, N.Y. TIMES, June
24, 2006, at A1 (noting that “nearly 1,000” hedge fund advisors had registered with the SEC as
required by the stricken rule).
126. See, e.g., Dale Oesterle, J. Gilbert Reese Chair in Contract Law at Moritz College of Law,
Ohio State University, & David Skeel, S. Samuel Arsht Professor of Corporate Law at the
University of Pennsylvania Law School, Debate on Legalaffairs.org: Should Hedge Funds be
Regulated (Nov. 8–11, 2005), available at http://www.legalaffairs.org/webexclusive/debateclub_
hedgefunds1105.msp.
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2. Chamber of Commerce (2006)
The same year as Goldstein, the Chamber of Commerce (the Chamber),
the industry group traditionally speaking for corporate management,127
launched its second challenge in as many years at SEC authority. In
Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, the famed trade association took aim at the
Commission’s response to trading scandals that had tarnished the
traditionally non-controversial mutual fund industry.128
Specifically, the Chamber took issue with the SECs revamped
“investment company governance” rule129 where it required that (1) the
board Chair at all mutual funds be independent of the fund’s adviser, and
(2) 75% of the mutual fund board be independent of the fund adviser.130
The Chamber’s three-pronged attack alleged that the SEC (1) had exceeded
its rulemaking authority under the IA Act,131 (2) had offered no justification
for the changes, and (3) had failed to abide by § 553 of the Administrative
Procedure Act132 in promulgating the amendments. 133
The last argument was adopted by the D.C. Circuit, which, in elevating
such details as cost estimates and the recordkeeping attending SEC
rulemaking, stated the following:
In sum, the combination of circumstances—inadequate notice that the
Commission would base its cost estimates for the two conditions on
‘publicly available’ extra-record materials on which it did not typically
rely in rulemakings; the Commission’s acknowledgement that the
rulemaking record contained gaps and did not include reliable cost data;
the availability of additional implementation data for the period between
the close of the rulemaking record and the Commission’s response to
Chamber I as more funds adopted the conditions; the Chamber’s colorable
claim that the Commission’s failure to consider such implementation data
harms its investment choices—suffices to show that the Chamber has been
prejudiced by the Commission’s reliance on materials not in, nor merely
‘supplementary’ to, the rulemaking record.134

By focusing on the mechanics of the process, the D.C. Circuit Court
thus vacated the two new conditions implemented by the SEC (i.e., 75%

127. See U.S. Chamber of Commerce, About Us, http://www.uschamber.com/about/
default.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2010).
128. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
129. See Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,520, 69
Fed. Reg. 46,378, at 46,381–82 (Aug. 2, 2004).
130. Press Release, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, U.S. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC Mutual
Fund “Governance” Litigation (Apr. 8, 2005), http://www.uschamber.com/nclc/news/casealerts/
ca050408.htm [hereinafter Press Release, U.S. Chamber of Commerce].
131. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (2006).
132. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).
133. See Press Release, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, supra note 130.
134. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890, 906 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
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outside directors and an independent director).135 The financial services
industry thus saw the nearly sacrosanct imprimatur of Commission
rulemaking again sullied, and the mutual fund industry returned largely to
its prior management protocols.
3. Financial Planners (2007)
The next year, Financial Planners Association, the umbrella group for
the nation’s investment advisors, successfully challenged the Commission’s
rulemaking.136 Again the D.C. Circuit proved inhospitable to SEC claims,
albeit, this time, its written decision spoke more directly to agency
legislative authority.137
For decades, the securities industry, home to both registered “brokerdealers” and the more heavily regulated “investment advisors,” had
operated under the SEC guidance that the two groups were separated by
considerations of compensation.138 The traditional dividing line was
cemented in 2005 via an SEC rule139 serving as a minefield for brokers
wishing to avoid becoming subject to the IA Act.
The Financial Planners Association challenged the 2005 codification as
discriminatory in that its constituency was being held to a higher legal
standard despite the inroads upon its services being made by broker-dealers
and the accompanying expansion of the traditional notion of “merely
incidental” investment advice.140 In vacating the rule, the D.C. Circuit (by
2-1 vote) held that the statutory language was clear on the topic of
exemptions, that the SEC rule was in direct conflict with Congressional
intent, and that IA Act subsection (f) was “not a catch-all that authorizes the
SEC to rewrite the statute.”141
The fallout from the decision was considerable. Countless brokerage
accounts treated by firms as outside of the dictates of the IA Act faced
reclassification, while their handlers faced uncertainty, at best, and

135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 909.
Fin. Planning Ass’n v. SEC, 482 F.3d 481 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
Id.
Elisse B. Walter, Comm’r, SEC, Address at the Mutual Fund Directors Forum Ninth
Annual Policy Conference: Regulating Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers: Demarcation or
Harmonization? (May 5, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch0505
09ebw.htm. A broker-dealer who was compensated largely on a commission basis and whose
investment advice was “merely incidental” to his brokerage services could avoid stricter rules
regarding customer disclosures and record keeping. Id.
139. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)11 (2006); see also Certain Broker-Dealers Deemed Not to be
Investment Advisors, Exchange Act Release No. 51523, Investment Advisers Act Release No.
2376, 70 Fed. Reg. 20,424 (Apr. 19, 2005).
140. Fin. Planning Ass’n, 482 F.3d at 484–85.
141. Id. at 491.
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violations, at worst.142 The industry’s immediate response was to clamor,
unsuccessfully, for the SEC to request a rehearing before the D.C.
Circuit.143 The long term strategy focused on interim Commission relief to
ease the transition from compliance with one law to two.144
C. MESSAGE AND AFTERMATH
Thus, in the years that the market engines were revving to
unprecedented calibrations, and its chief drivers speeding with an
unfathomable amount of gas, the message from the circuit housing the
SECs headquarters was clear: Even in expertised matters generally enjoying
deference, the agency’s rulemaking is not always legal.145 Such ciphers
would be mildly dangerous in quiet times; while the market was
overextending itself through “toxic” vehicles, they were outright crucial.
As 2010 unfolds, courts occasionally remind observers that the
judiciary shall play a role in the resolution of the economic crisis.146
However, such considerations of courthouse rebuke may still be a distant
second to an examination of the laws written, rewritten, or modified
between 1999 and 2002.
IV. CONGRESS: WHERE LAWS, BAILOUTS, AND MELTDOWNS
ARE MADE
A. PERCEPTIONS
A critically popular 2009 film documentary cataloguing the woes of
subprime mortgagors commenced with this provocative summary:
To understand why this [market] is like a gambling casino, you have to
understand what’s at stake here. On a December evening, December 15,

142. News Alert, W. Hardy Callcott & Kevin Zambrowicz, Bingham McCutchen, SEC
Rulemaking Authority Takes Another Hit: Fee-Based Brokerage Rule Vacated (Apr. 1, 2007),
http://www.bingham.com/Media.aspx?MediaID=4940.
143. Press Release, Sec. Indus. and Fin. Markets Assoc. (SIFMA), Fee-based Account Decision
Should be Reheard SIFMA Tells SEC (Apr. 10, 2007), http://www.sifma.org/news/
42771328.shtml.
144. Letter from Ira D. Hammerman, Senior Managing Dir. and Gen. Counsel, SIFMA, to
Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y, SEC (Nov. 30, 2007), http://www.sifma.org/regulatory/comment_
letters/59130958.pdf.
145. See generally Fin. Planning Ass’n v. SEC, 482 F.3d 481 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Goldstein v.
SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890 (D.C. Cir.
2006).
146. See, e.g., Mark Fass, Judge Slashes ‘Fat Cat’ Bank’s Bill for Subpoenaed Documents,
N.Y.L.J., Dec. 28, 2009, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202437287242
(describing the rejection by a Brooklyn, New York, judge of the request by a third party
(JPMorgan Chase) for reimbursement of costs attending document production in a case centering
on the confirmation of an arbitration award). The judge, noting the President’s reference to “fat cat
bankers” during a recent interview on television’s 60 Minutes, wrote “[t]his Court is not a
collection vehicle to further enrich already rich bankers.”Id.
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2000, around seven o’clock, Phil Gramm, Republican Senator of Texas,
then chair of the Senate Finance Committee, walked to the floor of the
Senate and introduced a 262 page bill - as a rider to the 11,000 page
appropriation bill - which excluded from regulation the financial
instruments that are probably most at the heart of the present meltdown.
He not only excluded them from all federal regulation, but he excluded
them from state regulation as well, which is important because these
instruments could be viewed to be gambling instruments, where you’re
betting on whether people will or will not pay off their loans. And he
announced at the time that this measure would be a boom to the American
economy, and be a boom to Wall Street, because they would be freed of
any supervision in this regard. And that lack of supervision freed Wall
Street to essentially shoot itself in both feet.147

The referenced vehicles are known as credit default swaps (CDS),
which are non-exchange traded, counterparty agreements which allow the
transfer of credit risk from one sophisticated party to another.148 A
somewhat novel derivative, the CDS does not fall within the jurisdiction of
any relevant federal regulator.149 Indeed, the term itself, “credit derivative,”
occasionally invites skepticism. As a noted journalist has written, credit
derivatives “are fashioned privately and beyond the ken of regulators—
sometimes even beyond the understanding of executives peddling them.”150
These private insurance agreements grew in popularity as nearly
unfathomable amounts of investment bank inventory were filled with
CDOs, defined generically as asset-backed securities, which were “backed
by a pool of bonds, loans, and other assets.”151 Amorphous and illunderstood, the CDO, unlike the CDS, has fallen squarely within SEC
jurisdiction as a “security.”152
147. AMERICAN CASINO (Table Rock Films and Argot Pictures 2009) (quoting Michael
Greenberg, Director for Trading and Markets, Commodity Futures Trading Commission)
(emphasis added).
148. See generally Credit Default Swap, Investopedia, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/
c/creditdefaultswap.asp (last visited Feb. 28, 2010); see also AMERICAN CASINO, supra note 147.
149. Janet Morrissey, Credit Default Swaps: The Next Crisis, TIME, Mar. 17, 2008, available at
http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1723152,00.html.
150. Morgenson, supra note 52.
151. JACK GUINAN, THE INVESTOPEDIA GUIDE TO WALL SPEAK: THE TERMS YOU NEED TO
KNOW TO TALK LIKE CRAMER, THINK LIKE SOROS, AND BUY LIKE BUFFET (2009); see also
SORKIN, supra note 21, at 89–90. Notably, longtime Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan
was quoted as follows:
“I’ve got some fairly heavy background in mathematics,” . . . . “But some of the
complexities of some of the instruments that were going into CDOs bewilders me. I
didn’t understand what they were doing or how they actually got the types of returns
out of the mezzanines and the various tranches of the CDO that they did.”
SORKIN, supra note 21, at 90 (quoting Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan).
152. See Caroline Zimmerman, SEC Opens Subprime Probe, NEWSER.COM, June 27, 2007,
http://www.newser.com/story/3580/sec-opens-subprime-probe.html
(describing
a
dozen
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Less amorphous is the regulatory zeal with which powerful market
regulators embraced the creativity of the private sector to fashion these
investments. It has been aptly documented that former Federal Reserve
Chairman Alan Greenspan ideologically opposed regulation of credit
derivatives.153 In the late 1990s, as the SEC gained moderate, indirect
ground by requiring that firms include “quantitative disclosure of market
risks” in financial statements,154 the drive at other agencies to inspire
exposure did not lose steam. At a speech in Florida in March 1999,
Greenspan openly exhorted the market utility of credit derivatives:
By far the most significant event in finance during the past decade has
been the extraordinary development and expansion of financial derivatives
. . . . The fact that [over-the-counter (OTC)] markets function quite
effectively without the benefits of [CFTC (Commodity Futures Trading
Commission) regulation] provides a strong argument for development of a
less burdensome regime for exchange-traded financial derivatives . . . .
These new financial instruments . . . enhance the ability to differentiate
risk and allocate it to those investors most able and willing to take it. This
unbundling improves the ability of the market to engender a set of product
and asset prices far more calibrated to the value preferences of
consumers . . . .155

B. THE LAW
The ensuing Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000
(CFMA)156 included various sections aimed at exempting OTC derivatives
dealers from CFTC jurisdiction. The most direct of these sections reads as
follows:
SEC. 103. LEGAL CERTAINTY FOR EXCLUDED DERIVATIVE
TRANSACTIONS.

Commission investigations into CDOs, defined as “shared debt packages reliant on faltering
subprime mortgages”); see also FINRA, Improving Examination Results (May 2008),
http://www.finra.org/Industry/Regulation/Guidance/ImprovingExaminationResults/p038526
(cautioning firms that FINRA examiners review “recommendations in new and non-conventional
products, such as hedge funds, CMOs/CDOs, REITS, auction rate securities and other structured
products” for customer suitability); see also Complaint at 5, ¶ 13, SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co.
& Fabrice Tourre, No. 10 CV-3229 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/
litigation/complaints/2010/comp21489.pdf (“CDOs are debt securities collateralized by
obligations including R[esidential] M[ortgage] B[acked] S[ecurities].”)
153. Edmund L. Andrews, Greenspan Concedes Error on Regulation, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23,
2008, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/24/business/economy/24panel.html.
154. See Joe Nocera, Risk Management: Were the Measures Used to Evaluate Wall Street
Trades Flawed? Or was the Mistake Ignoring Them?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 4, 2009, at 26.
155. TETT, supra note 1Error! Bookmark not defined., at 75 (quoting a March 1999 speech
by Fed Chairman, Alan Greenspan) (internal quotations omitted).
156. Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA), Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat.
2763A–365 (codified in scattered sections of 7, 11, 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
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Section 2 of the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 2, 2a, 3, 4,
4a) is further amended by adding the following to the end:
(d) EXCLUDED DERIVATIVE TRANSACTIONS.—
(1) IN GENERAL—Nothing in this Act…governs or applies to
an agreement, contract, or transaction in an excluded commodity
if –
(A) the agreement, contract, or transaction is entered
into only between persons that are eligible contract
participants at the time at which the persons enterinto the
agreement, contract, or transaction; and
(B) the agreement, contract, or transaction is not
executed or traded on a trading facility.
(2) ELECTRONIC TRADING FACILITY EXCLUSION.—Nothing
in this Act . . . governs or applies to an agreement, contract, or
transaction in an excluded commodity if –
(A) the agreement, contract, or transaction is entered
into on a principal-to-principal basis between parties trading
for their own accounts or as described in section
1a(12)(B)(ii);
...
(C) the agreement, contract, or transaction is executed or
traded on an electronic trading facility.157

When combined with definitions found in § 105 and § 106 of the
CFMA,158 the above provisions succeeded in exempting from the definition
of futures (and thus, CFTC examination) OTC derivative transactions
between sophisticated parties, away from a stock exchange—a category that
would later become synonymous with credit default swaps.159 Separate
modifications to the two primary securities laws were designed to erase the
SEC from the equation.160
Among the authorities not altered by the CFMA were: (1) banking
jurisdiction, (2) SEC fraud jurisdiction, and (3) extraterritorial reach (which
157. CFMA § 103, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2–4a (2006) (internal quotations omitted). Separately, Section
2A of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b-1 (2006), and Section 3A of the Securities Exchange
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c-1 (2006), were contemporaneously amended to prohibit the SEC from
imposing registration or recordkeeping requirements related to security-based swap agreements.
See Over-the-Counter Derivatives: Modernizing Oversight to Increase Transparency and Reduce
Risks: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities, Insurance, and Investment of the Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 45 n.1 (2009) (prepared statement of Mary L.
Schapiro, Chairman of the SEC).
158. CFMA § 105, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2–4a (2006); CFMA § 106, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2–4a; see also infra
note 180 and accompanying text.
159. CFMA § 103, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2–4a; CFMA § 206, 15 U.S.C. § 78f (2006).
160. See infra note 163 and accompanying text.
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was nonexistent both before and after the CFMA).161 As has been also
noted, the exclusion, albeit the incarnation of Greenspan’s dreams,
nonetheless successfully precluded oversight of the new vehicles by any
single regulator.162 Professor John Coffee of Columbia University School of
Law later testified that the CFMA achieved its goals:
In my judgment, the [current energy derivative] Amendment does not
“undo” the desirable legal certainty that the CFMA created. The original
uncertainty that led up to the CFMA arose because both the SEC and the
CFTC could dispute whether a complex derivatives transaction was more
like a futures contract (in which case the CFTC had jurisdiction) or more
like an option (in which case the SEC arguably had jurisdiction). Nothing
in the . . . Amendment will change the fact that the SEC is now totally out
of the picture, as the CFMA amended both the Securities Act of 1933 and
the Securities Exchange Act of 193[4] to deny the SEC any authority over
OTC derivatives (financial and non-financial).163

C. COMMENTARY
Freed from the oversight of both the SEC and the CFTC, market
players thus embarked on a course of internecine capitalism. The largest
investment houses over-leveraged themselves by stockpiling CDOs, while
having the risk of such ventures cushioned through reliance on
[unregulated] CDS agreements with third parties.164
But the populist view, that any emphasis in the CFMA on imposing
legal certainty was subordinated to commercial interests, supposes three
things: (1) that derivative businesses sprung up after the CFMA; (2) that
SEC and CFTC examiners, if given the chance, would have been able to
timely intervene; and (3) that anyone was capable of understanding the
exotic instruments at issue. Sources indicate that nary one of these
suppositions is reliable.165
First, the CFTC crusades to gain sovereignty over the swaps market had
repeatedly fallen short in the past. Perhaps overshadowed by a larger,
ongoing debate concerning sovereignty over futures,166 regulation of swaps
161. See JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 85–87 (6th
ed. 2009).
162. TETT, supra note 1, at 75 (quoting a lobbyist as declaring that “Congress nailed the door
shut in 2000 [on unified regulation], with the passage of the Commodities Futures Modernization
Act”).
163. CFTC Regulation and Oversight of Derivatives: Hearing Before the Comm. on
Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, 107th Cong. 133 (2002) (statement of Professor John C.
Coffee, Jr., Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law).
164. See SORKIN, supra note 21, at 14–15, 156–58.
165. See infra notes 166–90, 205 and accompanying text.
166. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE 106–09 (2008), available
at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/Blueprint.pdf [hereinafter TREASURY BLUEPRINT]
(detailing the debate over the dividing line between securities and future contracts, and its key
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ultimately fell irreparably behind the market,167 forcing Congress’ hand in
2000 in adopting any feasible measure to address the issue.
Second, the CFMA was hardly a one-sided law. What is often
overlooked is the fact that Congress simultaneously (and somewhat
inexplicably) expanded the express scope of § 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act to cover the newly exempted, non-security.168 Thus, the
CDS, while not subject to registration or routine examination, could be the
subject of a fraud case. The Commission routinely relies on such cases to
deter deleterious market behavior by professionals not subject to
registration requirements.169
Concurrently, the courts have not blindly applied the CFMA’s blanket
exemption. The most frequently cited (and pointed) example is Caiola v.
Citibank, N.A.,170 a Second Circuit decision from 2002. In that case, a
sophisticated individual specializing in the trading of Philip Morris Co.
stock, engaged in synthetic option transactions to offset equity swap
agreements.171 The complex arrangement was motivated by the desire to
shield the size of the plaintiff’s positions from the market in general.172 The
defendant bank was alleged to have, at some point, secretly countered the
complicated plan by effecting large trades that mirrored the plaintiff’s
synthetic transactions.173
timeline moments of 1975 (CFTC approval of the trading of GMNA certificates), 1981 (SEC
approval of GNMA options), 1982 (Futures Trading Act codifies the 1981 Shad-Johnson Accord,
which prohibited certain futures and cementing SEC jurisdiction over securities-based contracts),
and 1988 (“Report of the Presidential Task Force on Market Mechanisms,” recommending a sole
regulator)).
167. See TETT, supra note 1, at 23–27 (describing, among other things, applicability of outdated
“Basel I” banking standards to those engaging in derivatives).
168. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338, added the
following section to Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act:
Rules promulgated under subsection (b) . . . that prohibit fraud, manipulation, or insider
trading (but not rules imposing or specifying reporting or recordkeeping requirements,
procedures, or standards as prophylactic measures against fraud, manipulation, or
insider trading), and judicial precedents decided under subsection (b) . . . and rules
promulgated thereunder that prohibit fraud, manipulation, or insider trading, shall apply
to security-based swap agreements (as defined in section 206B of the Gramm-LeachBliley Act) to the same extent as they apply to securities. Judicial precedents decided
under section [17(a)] of [the Securities Act of 1933] and sections [9, 15, 16, 20 and
21A] . . . and judicial precedents decided under applicable rules promulgated under
such sections, shall apply to security-based swap agreements (as defined in section
206B of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act) to the same extent as they apply to securities.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006).
169. See, e.g., SEC v. Petters et al., Litig. Rel. No. 21, 124 (July 10, 2009) (announcing asset
freeze of hedge fund manager), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2009/
lr21124.htm.
170. Caiola v. Citbank, N.A., 295 F.3d 312, 312 (2d Cir. 2002).
171. Id. at 315.
172. Id. at 317.
173. COX ET AL., supra note 161, at 81–84.
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The Second Circuit, adhering to the text of the CFMA only insofar as
the effective date of the Act and its exemption were concerned, effectively
confirmed the uncertainty surrounding application of the securities laws to
the exotic products both prior to and after 2000.174 Finding Caiola’s equity
swaps from the late 1990s were not securities (and thus not subject to Rule
10b-5), the court simultaneously concluded, “[h]ad Caiola entered into his
synthetic stock transactions after the enactment of the CFMA, they clearly
would now be covered under Rule 10b-5” pursuant to the statutory
exemption.175
Moreover, the court simultaneously found the synthetic options to fall
within the statutory definitions of securities.176 Ruling contrary to some
federal court precedent,177 the Second Circuit rejected Citibank’s contention
that only an option on a security would be covered by the law, and “not an
option based on the value of a security.”178 Relying upon the language of
§ 3(a)(10) of the Securities Exchange Act, the court answered the question
of “whether a cash-settled over-the-counter option on Philip Morris Stock
similar to options commonly traded on the market” was a security in the
affirmative.179
This result is disturbing at best, for applicable § 206 of Gramm-LeachBliley Act (GLBA) had expressly defined “swap agreements” to include
options “based, in whole or in part, on the value of, any interest in, or any
quantitative measure or the occurrence of any event relating to” securities
or other assets.180 Regardless, the end result was that the plaintiff—who was
found to have hedged non-security swap agreements with security over-thecounter options—earned a reversal of the dismissal of his complaint and his
day in court, despite the contrary goal of the CFMA.181
Separately and subsequently, the Second Circuit in 2009 both animated
the CFMA and reminded observers of one of its purposes in SEC v.
Rorech.182 In that insider trading case, the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York refused to grant judgment for the defendants
on jurisdictional issues, noting:
In 2000, Congress passed the [CFMA], which amended § 10(b) to extend
the rules promulgated by the SEC under § 10(b) to prohibit fraud,
manipulation, and insider trading (but not the SEC’s prophylactic
reporting requirements), and judicial precedents decided under § 10(b), to
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Caiola, 295 F.3d at 331.
Id. at 327.
Id. at 324.
Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 925 F. Supp. 1270, 1278 (S.D. Ohio 1996).
Caiola, 295 F.3d at 325.
Id. at 325–26.
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 206, 113 Stat. 1338, 1393–94
(codified at 15 U.S.C. 78c (2006)).
181. Caiola, 295 F.3d at 330–31.
182. SEC v. Rorech, No. 09 Civ. 4329, 2009 WL 4729921 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2009).
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“security-based swap agreement[s] (as defined in [§] 206B of the
[GLBA]). . . .
....
....
. . . In this case, the face of the contracts does not reveal whether a
material term of the CDS was based on a security. . . . In any event, it
cannot be that traders can escape the ambit of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by
basing a CDS’s material term on a security, but simply omitting reference
to the security from the text of the CDS contract.183

The decision also cited a separate Southern District of New York case
for the premise that the “economic reality” of the instruments and the
public’s expectations of their nature” govern definitional debates.184 Thus, a
key circuit in the battle against securities fraud has on several occasions
subjugated the CFMA to larger notions, thus jeopardizing that legislation’s
legacy as a purely pro-business advancement.185
Third, it has always been within the authority of both the SEC and
CFTC to expand their respective jurisdictions to examine exotic products.186
An example of this can be seen in the March 2008 accord between the two
agencies, hastily drawn in response to calls from the Treasury Department
to merge the dueling entities. That agreement contained “specific principles
to guide future consideration of novel products, with the goal of reviewing
product filings expeditiously, providing legal certainty for participants,
encouraging market neutrality and choice, and enhancing innovation and
competitive growth.”187 In short, the overriding goals of the CFMA could
be met at any time with two strokes of agency pens.
Likewise, it bears noting that, even post-catastrophe, a consensus could
not be reached that the SEC and CFTC should be merged to end turf wars
and solidify jurisdiction. Although the goal was prioritized by the “Treasury

183. Id. at *4–5. But see Sch. Dist. of Erie v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, No. 08 CV 07892, 2009
WL 234128, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2009) (finding a swap to not be “security-based” for
purposes of §10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because the “only material term” was the floating interest rate
based upon the London Interbank Offered Rate).
184. Rorech, 2009 WL 4729921, at *6 (citing Stechler v. Sidley, Austin Brown & Wood,
L.L.P., 382 F. Supp. 2d 580, 596–97, 597 n.121 (determining whether options contract was a
security under the Exchange Act)).
185. See Caiola, 295 F.3d 312; see also Rorech, 2009 WL 4729921. Class action attorneys have
filed federal class action lawsuits alleging violations relating to CDS portfolios. See, e.g., Class
Action Complaint at 2, Jacksonville Police & Fire Pension Fund v. Am. Int’l Group, Inc., No. 1:08
Civ. 04772, 2008 WL 2196366 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2008) (alleging that the insurer improperly
represented the status and health of its CDS portfolio).
186. See Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC, SEC Sign
Agreement to Enhance Coordination, Facilitate Review of New Derivative Products (Mar. 11,
2008), available at http://www.cftc.gov/newsroom/generalpressreleases/2008/pr5468-08.html.
187. Id.
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Blueprint”188 for regulatory reform released by the Department of the
Treasury in March 2008, the idea fell out of favor in the successor
administration as political forces acknowledged that historically distinct
Congressional committees would not accede to a loss of oversight power.189
Simply put, if the turf war between securities and commodities regulators
were truly to blame for billions in losses, it would have been remedied by
now.
Thus, the perception that the CFMA opened the floodgates to
unregulated products is, at best, simplistic. The more edifying examination
might then be a study of the GLBA.190
D. GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY ACT
Amidst a relatively tranquil bull market, and a growing concern of
foreign competition, Congress moved in the waning months of the Clinton
administration to eradicate the last barrier to financial entity consolidation,
the Glass-Steagall Act.191 The barrier had been erected by § 20 of the GlassSteagall Act which, for over 60 years, forbade affiliation in any manner
between a bank and any “organization engaged principally in the issue,
flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution” of securities.192
Exceptions of the statutory, administrative, and judicial nature had
reduced the barrier to something less than absolute. Namely, § 16 of GlassSteagall expressly permitted banks of the 1930s to continue to buy and sell
securities “solely upon the order, and for the account of, customers.”193
Also, litigation later clarified that banks could purchase brokerages that
provided only “incidental services” to customers (i.e., that did not render
investment advice).194 Most importantly, government agency guidelines
established that bank ownership of securities, capped by a percentage
threshold, was permissible.195
188. See TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note 166, at 11–13.
189. See Jennifer Liberto, Avoiding the Next Big Financial Crisis, CNNMONEY.COM,
June 8, 2009, http://money.cnn.com/2009/06/05/news/economy/financial_regulation/index.htm
(explaining the political reasons for the SEC and CFTC continuing “on their separate ways”).
190. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
191. Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall Act), Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933)
(repealed 1999).
192. Id. § 20.
193. Id. § 16.
194. See Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 U.S. 207, 207
(1984) (upholding the approval by the Board of the purchase of The Charles Schwab Corp. by
BankAmerica Corp., a bank holding company, under the exception found in the Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (2006)).
195. See Revenue Limit on Bank-Ineligible Activities of the Subsidiaries of Bank Holding
Companies Engaged in Underwriting and Dealing in Securities, 61 Fed. Reg. 68,750-01 (Dec. 30,
1996) (amending the interpretation of “engaged principally” as stated in Section 20 of the Banking
Act of 1933 to increase “from 10 percent to 25 percent the amount of total revenue that a nonbank
subsidiary of a bank holding company . . . may derive from underwriting and dealing in securities
. . .”); see also Frontline: The Wall Street Fix (PBS television broadcast May 8, 2003).
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Nonetheless, perhaps primarily as a symbolic gesture, Congress
removed all technical barriers to conglomeration.196 Later on, the statute
clarified the presumed breadth of the term “financial” activities by, among
I think it’s pretty clear to say that [Citigroup CEO] Sandy Weill forced the hand of
Congress. I think it’s equally clear to say that the Fed forced the hand of Congress to do
something that they knew full well could not be done. What they said was, ‘At the end
of two years, if [Glass-Steagall was not repealed], you [Sandy Weill] will have to
disgorge.’ But everyone up here said, “Oh my. We can’t do that to our dear friend
Sandy Weill.”
The Wall Street Fix, supra (quoting Representative John Dingell (D. Mich.), commenting on the
Federal Reserve’s granting merging Citigroup Inc. and Salomon Inc. a 2-year exemption from the
prohibition of Glass-Steagall before its repeal in 1999).
196. The operative language of the GLBA, which amended Section 4 of the Bank Holding Act
of 1956, reads as follows:
SEC. 103. Financial Activities
(a) In general.—Section 4 of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (12
U.S.C. 1843) is amended by adding at the end the following new
subsections:
(k) Engaging in Activities That Are Financial in Nature.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding subsection (a), a financial holding
company may engage in any activity, and may acquire and retain the shares
of any company engaged in any activity, that the Board, in accordance with
paragraph (2), determines (by regulation or order)–
(A) to be financial in nature or incidental to such financial activity;
or
(B) is complimentary to a financial activity and does not pose a
substantial risk to the safety or soundness of depository institutions or the
financial system generally . . . .
....
....
(5) ACTIONS REQUIRED.—
(A) IN GENERAL.—The Board shall, by regulation or order, define,
consistent with the purposes of this Act, the activities described in
subparagraph (B) as financial in nature, and the extent to which such
activities are financial in nature or incidental to a financial activity.
(B) ACTIVITIES.—The activities described in this subparagraph are
as follows:
(i) Lending, exchanging, transferring, investing for others, or
safeguarding financial assets other than money or securities.
(ii) Providing any device or other instrumentality for
transferring money or other financial assets.
(iii) Arranging, effecting, or facilitating financial transactions
for the account of third parties. . . .
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. 106-102, § 103(a), 113 Stat. 1138, 1342, 1345 (1999)
(emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted).
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other things, authorizing the Federal Reserve Board to permit banks’
involvement with “[l]ending, exchanging, transferring, investing for others,
or safeguarding financial assets other than money or securities,”197
“[p]roviding any device or other instrumentality for transferring money or
other financial assets,”198 and “[a]rranging, effecting, or facilitating
financial transactions for the account of third parties.”199
The authority to exempt was thus detailed and replete, and the passage
of the law invited universal praise. The press reported that the bill had
passed easily and constituted “one of the most significant achievements this
year by the White House and the Republicans leading the 106th
Congress.”200 Likewise, Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers was quoted
as saying that the “historic legislation” would “better enable American
companies to compete in the new economy.”201
E. COMMENTARY
Critics of the allocation of blame to the GLBA note that, while the act
did formally repeal Glass-Steagall, it was well known within financial
circles that the 1987 appointment of Alan Greenspan as Federal Reserve
Chairman signaled a move away from the artificial distinctions between
commercial and investment banks.202 Further, a defense of the GLBA has
surfaced. This position asserts that, even with the benefit of hindsight, the
law is laudable because it has permitted floundering investment banks to
continue as commercial banks.203
What appears undeniable, however, is that the GLBA publicly raised
the stakes; the law created a financial world where the largest players had to
engage in the most speculative strategies to compete. As one awardwinning financial journalist summarized:
The repeal of Glass-Steagall legitimized the concept of combining
commercial and investment banking to construct ‘one-stop-shopping’
empires, and many more mergers quickly followed, not just across
different sectors of finance but across national borders, too. The formerly
stodgy German commercial lender Deutsche Bank announced that it was
purchasing the freewheeling Bankers Trust. Deutsche also hired a large
chunk of Merrill Lynch’s former trading group, tasking them with creating
a derivatives business. Credit Suisse, the once-dull Swiss group, grabbed
DLJ, another American broker. The industry was rapidly adjusting to a
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Stephen Labaton, Congress Passes Wide-Ranging Bill Easing Bank Laws, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 5, 1999, at A1.
201. Id.
202. See, e.g., Clyde Mitchell, Ten Years After Gramm-Leach-Bliley: A Defense, N.Y.L.J., Dec.
16, 2009.
203. Id.
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new reality that banks needed to be big and offer a full range of services in
order to compete at all.204

Most importantly, the resulting data is unavoidable. Lehman Brothers,
in efforts to transform itself from a “second-tier bond trading shop into a
full-service investment bank,” took sizeable real estate positions on to its
balance sheets (resulting in short-lived but significant profits in years such
as 2006).205 Between 2007 and 2008, Lehman raced from twenty-five times
leveraged to thirty-five times leveraged.206 The ensuing market demise has
been sublime: A company whose stock traded over $80 a share in 2007 has
seen the price ride under $1 a share since mid-September 2008.207 Overall,
euphoric visions of rising to the level of a multi-service financial power led
the 158-year old firm, like other entities, to hazardously ratchet up its assetdebt ratio to precipitate its own ruin.208
AIG remains the most illustrative case in point. The enormous CDS
business attributed to that troubled giant was housed in a London subsidiary
titled “AIG Financial Products” (AIGFP).209 AIGFP dates from the late
1990s and is not subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC or any insurance
regulator. Most tellingly, since 2004 (i.e., post-GLBA), it has been overseen
by the OTS.210 Such a line of supervision seems obtuse in that, based upon a
CDS portfolio of approximately $500 billion, the subsidiary generated $250
million in annual insurance premiums by 2007.211
F. AFTERMATH
In the wake of the Crisis, a wide variety of pending federal remedies
attested to the quantifiable change in Congressional mood, as well as the
diversity and specificity of that deliberative body’s interest, once adequately
provoked. Bills introduced in 2008 and 2009 would have mandated
shareholder say in corporate governance,212 reinstated the stock exchanges’

204.
205.
206.
207.

TETT, supra note 1, at 73.
Leonard, supra note 20.
COHAN, supra note 19, at 1.
See the company’s historical stock quotes at MarketWatch.com, Lehman Bros. Historical
Stock Quotes, http://www.marketwatch.com/investing/stock/LEHMQ (last visited Feb. 25, 2009).
208. In September 2008, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code. See Press Release, Lehman Brothers, Holdings Inc. Announces it Intends to
File Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Petition; No Other Lehman Brothers’ U.S. Subsidiaries or Affiliates,
Including its Broker-Dealer and Investment Management Subsidiaries, are Included in the Filing
(Sept. 15, 2008), http://www.lehman.com/press/pdf_2008/091508_lbhi_chapter11_announce.pdf.
Various authors, journalists and critics have posed the unanswered question as to why that entity
did not receive a government bailout. See, e.g., Morgenson, supra note 52 (referencing the federal
officials who “let Lehman die”).
209. Morgenson, supra note 52.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Shareholder Bill of Rights Act of 2009, S. 1074, 111th Cong. (2009).
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“uptick rule” abolished by the SEC in 2007,213 imposed uniform
requirements on mortgage loan originators,214 legislated registration of
hedge funds,215 expanded the prosecutorial authority of the SEC,216 created
a “systemic risk monitor” to oversee all markets,217 or clarified the
regulation of credit default swaps.218
Such legislative solutions offered by the nation’s highest deliberative
body may best signal that effective regulation was always within
Washington’s grasp. Stated bluntly, there would likely be no AIG bailout in
2008 or 2009 but for the GLBA eradication of business restrictions imposed
after the Great Depression in the absence of replacement safeguards.
There is a postscript on the deleterious effects of the GLBA. While it
was to be expected that established entities would increase their presence in
other markets, the GLBA also created a new type of company on the
regulatory scorecard, the Financial Holding Company.219 Certain of these
entities would fall through the cracks of existing lines of federal
supervision, leading to one of the most embarrassing of SEC failures in
recent years.220
V. THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION:
DECISIONS TOO WEAK TO DEFEND?
A. PERCEPTIONS
The negative perceptions of the SEC seemed to have coalesced in the
nation’s recent, trying times. An under-funded and generally inept SEC
failed to foresee the dangers in the growing use of leverage and the
dramatic alterations in industry relationships. Further, acquiescence to the
White House’s conservative views on regulation under George W. Bush

213. H.R. 302, 111th Cong. (2009).
214. Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act of 2007, H.R. 3915, 110th Cong.
(2008).
215. The Hedge Fund Transparency Act of 2009, S. 344, 111th Cong. (2009).
216. Compliance, Examinations, and Inspections Restructuring Act of 2009, H.R. 2622, 111th
Cong. (2009).
217. Financial System Stabilization and Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1754, 111th Cong. (2009).
218. Derivatives Markets Transparency and Accountability Act of 2009, H.R. 977, 111th
Cong. (2009). As this article goes to print, the United States Senate is considering a broad array of
financial reforms. See David M. Herszenhorn & Edward Wyatt, Republicans Allow Debate on
Financial Overhaul, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/
04/29/business/29regulate.html?dbk.
219. See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & HILLARY A. SALE, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS 48–50 (11th ed. 2009).
220. See Testimony Concerning the Role of Federal Regulators: Lessons from the Credit Crisis
for the Future of Regulation: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government
Reform, 110th Cong. (2008) (unpublished statement of Christopher Cox, Chairman of the SEC),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2008/ts102308cc.htm.
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endangered market participants.221 The dangers hit home when the Madoff
scandal broke and it was manifestly clear that red flags had been ignored.
As a result, the agency that so often boasted of serving as “the investor’s
advocate,” celebrated its 75th birthday by fighting to justify its existence.222
Indeed, the perception has been perpetuated, somewhat, by the
Commission’s post-President Bush management, which has repeatedly
cited growing obligations and scarcity of Congressional funding as largely
to blame for the inefficiencies of recent years.223 As cited by current SEC
Chairwoman Mary Schapiro, during the most critical years of the Crisis, the
Commission saw its modest staff of approximately 3600 employees reduced
by 10%, a decline attributed to “several years of flat or declining
budgets.”224 As has been concurrently noted, even before the agency
assumes any proposed registration responsibilities for hedge funds and
private equity firms, it already oversees 12,000 public companies; 4600
mutual funds; 11,300 investment advisers; and 5500 broker-dealers.225
Further, the budgetary defense for the agency’s failures has thus, at times,
resulted first and foremost in a polarized debate between Congress and
Commission officials,226 resulting in the delay of significant reform.
B. DETAILS
But staffing and budgets in the years 2005-2008 do not appear as
stultifying as Commission officials may claim. The SEC’s own numbers, as
evidenced in its annual Performance and Accountability Reports for 2005
and 2008, showed that when compared to 2005, the SEC was more
successful in 2008 for obtaining Enforcement results (92% vs. 91%),
reducing the time necessary to review corporate filings (25.2 days vs. 26.1
days), and increasing the percentage of timely resolved Self Regulatory
Organizations (SROs) rule filings (86% v. 80%). In addition, the percentage
of investment adviser and mutual funds registrants examined in 2008
remained the same as in 2005 (14%).227 Moreover, while the Commission
221. See, e.g., Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Seeks to Curtail Investor Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13,
2007, at C1 (citing speeches by Commission officials and an amicus brief urging the Supreme
Court to adopt a pleadings test requiring a “high likelihood” of intent to commit fraud as indicia
that the agency had “begun to take steps on two fronts to protect corporations, executives and
accounting firms from investor lawsuits that accuse them of fraud”).
222. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Top Cop or Regulatory Flop? The SEC at 75, 95 VA. L. REV. 785
(2009).
223. Schapiro Testimony, supra note 12.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. See, e.g., Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Chief Pursues Tougher Enforcement, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
22, 2009, at B1.
227. See SEC, 2008 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 29, 32, 36, 44 (2008),
available at http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar2008.pdf#sec2. The report notes that “[i]n
[fiscal year] 2008, the percentage of first enforcement actions filed within two years exceeded the
planned level” and was “higher than [fiscal year] 2007 results.” Id. at 31.
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may have continued to evidence its traditionally high attrition rate among
employees there was no departmental collapse, as the multi-purposed,
widespread structure of the agency remains intact.228 Further, the
Commission is quick to tout its prompt, dedicated responses to the Crisis,
all of which belies any budgetary paralysis.229
Separately, while the journalistic trend is to lampoon the efforts of the
SEC to follow leads or detect overwhelming frauds,230 the problem runs
longer and deeper than any missed tips. Commencing in 2000, and perhaps
reaching a crescendo in 2004, the SEC, albeit understaffed and strife with
political interference, deliberately and consistently pursued ill-advised
courses of action with direct consequence to the market.
Three such questionable interpretations at the Commission warrant the
most scrutiny: (1) the easing of traditional net capital restrictions for brokerdealers; (2) the reluctance to impose regulation on credit ratings agencies;
and (3) the avoidance of any restrictions on burgeoning margin lending to
customers.
1. The Consolidated Enterprise Compromise of 2004
It is now axiomatic that the SEC erred when, in April 2004, it privately
agreed to a relaxation of the net capital rules in favor of the largest brokerdealers.231 The agreement (acquiesced to by all five Commissioners)
permitted the nation’s largest financial service firms to legally “upstream”
funds to their Bank Holding Companies, thus freeing up millions in funds
for purchase of exotic investments.232 The ugly compromise233 has received

228. See Schapiro Testimony, supra note 12; see also SEC, Organization of the SEC,
http://www.sec.gov/images/secorg.pdf (the SEC’s current organizational chart).
229. Press Release, SEC, SEC Actions During Turmoil in Credit Markets (last updated Jan. 22,
2009), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/sec-actions.htm (listing in excess of two dozen responses in
areas of enforcement, rulemaking, and examination).
230. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Credit Ratings Agencies in Congressional Crosshairs, N.Y.L.J.,
Jan. 21, 2010, at 5 (comparing the agency to bumbling Inspector Clouseau of the Pink Panther
movies).
231. Kevin Drawbaugh, US SEC Clears New Net-Capital Rules for Brokerages, REUTERS,
Apr. 28, 2004, http://securities.stanford.edu/news-archive/2004/20040428_Headline08_Draw
baugh.htm.
232. See Stephen Labaton, Agency’s ’04 Rule Let Banks Pile Up New Debt, and Risk, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 3, 2008, at A1 (discussing the exemption codified in Alternative Net Capital
Requirements for Broker-Dealers That Are Part of Consolidated Supervised Entities, Exchange
Act Release No. 49,830, 69 Fed. Reg. 34,428 (June 21, 2004)); see also COHAN, supra note 19, at
448 (referencing the June 2004 changes to net capital rules that permitted “securities firms to
increase the amount of leverage they could use on their balance sheets to forty times equity while
traditional banks, by statute, had to keep the leverage closer to ten times equity”).
233. See Labaton, supra note 232 (A “senior staff member” was quoted as stating that the
compromise would result in meaningful access to holding company ledgers, as the SEC would
utilize “people with strong quantitative skills to parse the banks’ balance sheets.”).
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far-reaching attention in the years since, even inviting scrutiny from such
off-topic popular periodicals as Rolling Stone Magazine.234
i. Purpose of (and Relief From) 15c3-1
Since 1965, SEC Rule 15c3-1 has been in force.235 The Rule serves at
least three purposes: (1) avoidance of dependence on customer funds; (2)
efficient operation of markets; and (3) deterrence to violative conduct.236
The Rule is generally perceived as establishing “early warning
thresholds.”237 Concurrently, even errors in (or omissions of) requisite
calculations are disciplinable.238
It was thus no coincidence that the largest financial firms came to the
SEC seeking relief from the strict and ubiquitous net capital rule before
feeling comfortable with the now notorious rush to unprecedented
leveraging.239 The SEC expressly responded, via a formal rule interpretation
allowing certain broker-dealers to utilize a “voluntary, alternative method of
computing deductions to net capital.”240 In return, this short list of firms
agreed to a heightened internal alarms system and to subject its holding
company and affiliates to “group-wide Commission supervision”(termed
Consolidated Entity Supervision).241
In fairness to the Commission, the hazardous move was made, at least
in part, to obtain jurisdiction over investment bank holding companies who
were not subject to U.S. bank regulators because they did not own
commercial banks,242 and in a climate of urged competitive deregulation.
The financial press, in particular, gave much attention to the notions that the
234. See Matt Taibbi, Wall Street’s Naked Swindle, ROLLING STONE, Oct. 15, 2009, at 50,
available at http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/story/30481512/wall_streets_naked_swindle/2;
see also Julie Satow, Ex-SEC Official Blames Agency for Blow-Up of Broker-Dealers, N.Y. SUN,
Sept. 18, 2008, available at http://www.nysun.com/business/ex-sec-official-blames-agency-forblow-up/86130/ (discussing the collapse of Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, and Merrill Lynch).
235. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (2008).
236. See Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 27249, 54 Fed. Reg. 40,395, at 40,396
(Oct. 2, 1989) (“Finally, if the liability of a broker-dealer to its customers from violations of state
and federal law is to be a deterrent to improper conduct, a firm should be required to maintain a
reasonable financial stake in its business.”).
237. See COFFEE & SALE, supra note 219, at 666–67.
238. See, e.g., Direct Brokerage, Inc., NYSE Hearing Panel Decision No. 05-171 (Sept. 12,
2006), available at http://www.nyse.com/DiscAxn/discAxn_10_2006.html (finding violations of
SEC Rule 15c3-1 and NYSE Rule 325 based upon failure to both maintain firm net capital at
required levels and to compute net capital as required).
239. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 230 (noting that mid-decade, five underwriter firms handled
“the majority of mortgage-backed securitizations”).
240. Alternative Net Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers that are Part of Consolidated
Supervised Entities, Exchange Act Release No. 49830, 69 Fed. Reg. 34,428, at 34,428 (June 21,
2004).
241. Id.
242. See Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC, Address at the Security Traders 12th Annual
Washington Conference (May 7, 2008), available at www.sec.gov/news/speech/2008spch05
0708cc.htm.
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Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 had so encumbered American businesses with
red tape that their European counterparts were raising money cheaper and
faster.243 Nonetheless, Consolidated Entity Supervision was, by all
accounts, a disaster. With the express blessing of their most immediate
regulator, the largest broker-dealers facilitated leveraging at the parent
company level that would reach Biblical proportions. Both the ensuing
blurred ledgers and billions in losses were unprecedented.
ii. Aftermath
Consolidated Entity Supervision was de facto terminated via the
inevitable and involuntary transformation of its participants: two of the five
holding companies filed for bankruptcy, two converted to commercial
banks to avail themselves of federal funding, and one merged.244 As an
ongoing concept, the notion was tersely, but resolutely, abolished by the
White House’s Financial Reform Plan of June 2009.245 In view of the
massive monies freed for speculation, the consistent criticism thereof, the
relatively weak motives for the move and the immediate remedy by the new
White House, the variegated form of accounting does seem justifiably
blamed for a large share of the Crisis. But SEC inaction in other areas was
just as harmful.
2. Unregulated Credit Rating Agencies
Investment banking houses could only grow their CDO inventories to
unspeakable proportions if a third party was blessing them. The top three
ratings agencies thus served as the seal of approval for an investment that
was, at best, misunderstood. As one Wall Street Journal writer tersely
described the phenomenon: “Rating firms became a crutch.”246
243. See, e.g., Gariel Nahoum, Note, Small Cap Companies and the Diamond in the Rough
Theory: Dispelling the IPO Myth and Following the Regulation A and Reverse Merger Examples,
35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1865, 1865 (2007) (detailing the focus of The Wall Street Journal in 2007 on
the possibility of the U.S. “losing its appeal to foreign investors”).
244. See Labaton, supra note 232.
245. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT BD., DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY
REFORM A NEW FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION 12
(2009), available at http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport_web.pdf (“We
propose also eliminating the SEC’s Supervised Investment Bank Holding Company program.
Investment banking firms that seek consolidated supervision by a U.S. regulator should be subject
to supervision and regulation by the Federal Reserve.”).
246. David Wessel, Lessons from the Housing Bubble, WALL ST. J., May 29, 2008, at A2,
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121200132477426865.html.
[I]nvestors who relied on the ratings agencies—particularly supposedly sophisticated
pension funds and other institutions—are at fault, too. Rating firms became a crutch for
investors who simply didn’t want to spend the time and money required to be prudent
investors at a time when low interest rates had everyone reaching for higher returns
without contemplating the higher risks.
Id.
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Regarding ratings agencies, the SEC was, and still is, the law. Although
the statutory responsibility of the Commission to oversee national credit
ratings agencies has been sketchy, the fact remains that the Commission has
exercised its authority to designate such agencies since at least 1975.247
The SEC floated the idea of formal rating agency registration in 1997,
but the idea was received in lukewarm fashion by the industry.248 In 2003,
the Commission invited public comment on new rules for the agencies.249
That SEC Release perhaps begged the question of just how conflicted the
rating game had gotten when it asked the industry the following question:
“Is it appropriate to require strict firewalls between the broker-dealer
employees who develop internal credit ratings and those responsible for
revenue production?”250
Nearly fifty commenters weighed in on the release, often in stark
terms.251 An accounting professor at MIT outright called for the
requirement that credit rating agencies disclose the source of their
revenues.252 State regulators in Texas expressly suggested that agencies be
required to adopt procedures addressing issuer and subscriber
“influence.”253
Many commentators on the 2003 release expressly opined that the
credit rating agency demarcation had outlived its utility;254 credit rating
agencies needed to be regulated in the same manner as the companies they

247. See Memorandum from Davis Polk & Wardwell to Interested Persons 2 (June 24, 2008),
http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/15413afd-084a-47cc-af827b7a5371c669/Presentation
/PublicationAttachment/1e0cd7b8-9b1a-4f61-80c67d969df334f9/06.24.08.nrsro.proposals.pdf
(“Before the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act [of 2006], the SEC staff followed an informal
practice of recognizing certain credit rating agencies as [National Recognized Statistical Rating
Organizations] for regulatory purposes through the issuance of no-action letters.”); see also
Coffee, supra note 230 (referencing the “de facto regulatory licenses” long granted the credit
rating agencies by the SEC and banking agencies).
248. See Rating Agencies and the Use of Credit Ratings Under the Federal Securities Laws,
Securities Act Release No. 8236, Exchange Act Release No. 47,972, Investment Company Act
Release No. 26,066, 68 Fed. Reg. 35,258 (June 12, 2003) (discussing the 1997 proposal and the
SEC’s decision not to act on it).
249. Id.
250. Id. at 35,259.
251. See id.
252. Letter from Joseph Weber, Assistant Professor of Accounting, Mass. Inst. Tech. Sloan Sch.
of Mgmt., to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, SEC (June 25, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov
/rules/concept/s71203/jweber062503.htm.
253. See Letter from Denise Voigt Crawford, Sec. Comm’r, Tex. Sec. Bd., to Jonathan G. Katz,
Sec’y, SEC (July 28, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/s71203/dcrawford
072803.pdf.
254. See Letter from Lawrence White, Professor of Econ., N.Y. Univ. Stern Sch. of Bus., to the
SEC (July 25, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/s71203/lwhite072503.txt. “I
strongly urge the SEC to abolish the regulatory category of ‘nationally recognized statistical rating
organization’ (NRSRO) and to cease its use of the NRSRO criterion for deciding which rating
company’s ratings can be used for the SEC’s regulatory purposes.” Id.
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rate,255 or under a separate scheme altogether.256 One commentator
exhibited clairvoyance when he suggested that the SEC act “in a timely
fashion to provide these answers now, instead of after some (another)
financial or stock market calamity.”257
Between 2003 and 2006, the SEC did nothing tangible in response to
the comments. In 2006, Congress took up the task and passed the Credit
Rating Agency Reform Act.258 That law called upon the Commission to
implement new rules, which it did in 2007.259 The timeline thus edifies that
the agency, uneasy with a supervisory role it inherited by default, simply
shunned final action until it was ordered by Congress. Of course, the credit
rating agencies, unfettered by meaningful regulation in the years preceding
the Crisis, profited mightily from the “issuer pays” system that produced so
many questionable evaluations of CDOs.260
3. Unwillingness to Tighten Margin Lending
One area where the SEC’s oversight ability is not subject to claims of
vagueness is margin lending. However, the primary purpose of the margin
rules (those unique limitations on the initial purchase of stock) has all but
been forgotten. The constraints were originally designed to protect Wall
Street from itself.261 Indeed, scholars remain stunned by the fact that
brokerage houses in the 1920s were lending customers 95% of the purchase

255. See Letter from Malcolm S. Macdonald, Vice President Fin. and Treasurer, Ford Motor
Co., to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, SEC (July 28, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/
rules/concept/s71203/ford072803.pdf.
256. See Letter from Barbara Roper, Dir. of Investor Prot., Consumer Fed’n of Am., to Jonathan
G. Katz, Sec’y, SEC (July 28, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/s71
203/broper072803.pdf.
257. Letter from Martin Goldberg to the SEC (June 7, 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/s71203/mgoldberg060703.txt.
258. Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat. 1327 (codified
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
259. See Final Rule: Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies Registered as Nationally Registered
Statistical Rating Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 55,857, 72 Fed. Reg. 33,564 (June 18,
2007).
260. See, e.g., Amanda Bahena, Univ. of Iowa Ctr. for Int’l Fin. and Dev., What Role Did
Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) Play in the Financial Crisis?, http://www.uiowa.edu/ifdebook/
issues/financial_crisis/posters/Amanda%20Final%20Draft.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2010); see
also Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, § 6003(c), 111th
Cong. (2009) (as passed by House of Representatives, Dec. 11, 2009, creating a private cause of
action for investors against credit ratings agencies).
261. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN & DAVID L. RATNER, BROKER DEALER REGULATION: CASES
AND MATERIALS 554–56 (2003) (“Although the basic purpose of the margin regulations is to
restrict stock market speculation, rather than to protect individual customer . . . .”).
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value of their securities.262 If not the incontrovertible cause of the Great
Depression, it was most certainly an aggravating factor.263
Thus, in 1934, when the Securities Exchange Act was adopted, § 7
therein264 delegated margin rulemaking authority to one agency: The
Federal Reserve Board (the Fed). The Fed adopted famed Regulation T,265
which, since 1974, has capped the amount that a brokerage house may lend
a retail customer for the initial purchase of most stock at 50%.266 After that
day of purchase, margin is regulated by the brokerage houses themselves
(who routinely set “house rates” that are stricter than the 25% set by the
stock exchanges).267 The problem, simply stated, is that the more brokerage
houses lend, the more money they make, and the temptation has never been
eradicated.268
In prior crises, regulators worked feverishly to rein in the amount of
consumer credit on Wall Street. For example, in the Spring 2000, both the
Fed and the Commission publicly questioned the increased amount of
margin being afforded American investors.269 The stock exchanges
themselves subsequently threatened to tighten lending rules governing their
membership.270 The scrutiny of broker-dealer lending culminated in SEC
approval of an National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) rule
change obligating firms to delivering a uniform disclosure statement on the
262. See Paul Alexander Gusmorino, Main Causes of the Great Depression, GUSMORINO
WORLD, May 13, 1996, http://www.gusmorino.com/pg3/greatdepression/index.html.
263. See also JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH 1929 20 (Houghton Mifflin
Harcourt Publishing Company 2009) (1954).
Margins—the cash which the speculator must supply in addition to the securities to
protect the loan and which he must augment if the value of the collateral securities
should fall and so lower the protection they provide—are effortlessly calculated and
watched . . . . Wall Street, however, has never been able to express its pride in these
arrangements. They are admirable and even wonderful only in relation to the purpose
they serve. The purpose is to accommodate the speculator and facilitate speculation.
But the purposes cannot be admitted. If Wall Street confessed this purpose, many
thousands of moral men and women would have no choice but to condemn it for
nurturing an evil thing and call for reform.
Id.

264.
265.
266.
267.

15 U.S.C. § 78g (2006).
12 C.F.R. §§ 220.1–220.12 (2009).
Id.
See, e.g., NYSE, Inc., Rule § 431 (2008), available at http://nyserules.nyse.com/
NYSE/Rules/ (follow “General Rules” hyperlink; then follow “Operation of Member
Organizations (Rules 325 – 465)” hyperlink in sidebar).
268. See Gretchen Morgenson, Something Borrowed May Leave Market Blue, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
30, 2000, at 3.1 (stating “lending money to investors is very lucrative for these firms; they reap
both margin interest and extra commissions from investors buying twice the stock they would
have otherwise”).
269. See, e.g., Knight Tribune News Service, Use of Margin Buying Soars to the Chagrin of
SEC, FLA. TIMES UNION, Apr. 2, 2000, at H5.
270. See Margin Credit Fell in April, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2000 (“The NASD said last month
that it would prod the NYSE to join it in trying to toughen margin requirements.”).
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dangers of margin investing to all existing and potential margin
customers.271 Whether it was because of the scrutiny, the rule change, or
both, margin debt fell at both the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and
NASD firms in 2001.272
But as time passed, so did the scrutiny. Between 2002 and 2006, margin
totals increased 60% at NYSE firms and over 200% at NASD firms.273 Such
brokerage houses effect trades for hedge funds and other speculators, all of
which were allowed to increase their leverage. For some, the lack of new
margin rules or tightened regulations was hardly a surprise. In fact,
commentators had casually expected the administration of George W. Bush
to effectuate its professed desire to ease up on business regulation.274
Perhaps more than anywhere else, that drive reached fruition in the
everyday world of stock brokerage. Thus, any survey of SEC
actions/omissions precipitating the Crisis must note the agency’s reluctance
to tighten margin lending, which credit enabled untold market losses.
C. STATUS
The dedicated hesitancy of the Commission to rein in Wall Street’s net
capital, credit rating, and lending practices inevitably leads to cries by
journalists and practitioners alike of political intervention.275 The anger has
spread to academics, who are quick to also point to the dubious timing of
many SEC trial tactics.276

271. See FINRA, NASD Notice to Members 01-31: Margin Disclosure, SEC Approves NASD
Rule Proposal Requiring Delivery of Margin Disclosure Statement to Non-Institutional Customers
285 (May 2001), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/rules_regs/documents/notice_to_
members/p003871.pdf (explaining SEC approval of new NASD Rule 2341).
272. See Press Release, FINRA, Margin Statistics (Jan. 4, 2010), http://www.finra.org/Investor
Information/InvestmentChoices/MarginInformation/p005923 (providing a historical, monthly
listing of margin totals for both of the major stock exchanges and disclosing a 33% drop at NYSE
firms and a 44% drop at NASD firms between 2000 and 2001).
273. See id. (summarily concluding, “[i]ncreasingly, investors are purchasing on margin”).
274. See, e.g., William L. Watts, Bush Regulators May Relax: But Completely Hands-off
Approach Unlikely, CBS.MARKETWATCH.COM, Dec. 26, 2000, http://www.marketwatch.com/
story/bush-regulators-may-be-more-relaxed.
275. See, e.g., Deborah G. Heilizer et al., FINRA 2008: An Oscar Winning Year?, 37 SEC. REG.
L.J. 279, 280 (2009), available at http://www.sutherland.com/files/Publication/0190aaf4-bdb04919-ade1-4cb1dc7c1c43/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/e4efad1b-3725-418b-ad7551f0e0c81ccc/Rubin_2009.pdf (citing Zachary A. Goldfarb, In Cox Years at the SEC, Policies
Undercut Action; Red Tape Halted Cases, Drove Down Penalties, WASH. POST, June 1, 2009, at
A1) (referencing “the SEC’s well-publicized retrenchment on the enforcement front”).
276. See Velvel on National Affairs: The SEC’s Brief Filed Before Judge Lifland in Madoff,
http://velvelonnationalaffairs.blogspot.com/2009/12/secs-brief-filed-before-judge-lifland.html
(Dec. 21, 2009, 03:22pm). Lawrence Vlevel, Dean of the Massachusetts School of Law, decries
the timing and substance of the SEC’s brief filed in a case centering on valuation of Madoff
victims’ claims, asserting that the Commission would support the Judge’s decision “if he follows
the SEC’s method of partial alleviation.” Id.
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Still others steadfastly defend the agency, the abolition or subordination
of which does seem to be both premature and impractical.277 The more
enlightened approach parses the myriad SEC responsibilities, according
high marks for prosecutions and low ones for oversight of financial
planning.278
The latest words of reform accentuate the difficulties in detection.
Specifically, the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009,
among many other changes, would create the interagency Financial
Services Oversight Council to oversee systemic risk, identify “systemically
important companies and activities . . . [and] resolve jurisdictional disputes”
between federal agencies.279 Likewise, a new Consumer Financial
Protection Agency would focus on consumer financial activities, including
mortgage loan practices and disclosures.280 As the inclination to re-tool the
government arsenal gets set to weather political storms, the more accurate
appraisal (and obtainable result) may posit that the Commission must
simply set more consistent priorities and make better choices, or once again
find itself fighting for survival.
CONCLUSION: OF LAWS AND SAUSAGES . . .
To be sure, there are regulatory issues to be explored other than the
ones detailed herein in an effort to hone the blade of culpability for the twoyear economic freefall. The bizarre alliance of private and public flaws that
caused the Crisis perhaps serve to isolate any one contributor from blame.
One could easily ask whether the 1970 NYSE decision to allow investment
firms to go public foretold of the days when management would place
quarterly profits above fundamental corporate health.281
Frightfully scarce from critiques to date are detailed studies of the
oversight of major firms like Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers by the
stock exchanges—those entities that are only permitted to utilize the

277. See, e.g., Arthur S. Greenspan, Responses and Strategies in Dealing with a Changed SEC,
N.Y.L.J., Dec. 10, 2009, at 5 (“It has come under considerable public criticism over the past few
years, but the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission remains one of the most important civil
law enforcement authorities for the U.S. financial services industry and for U.S. public
companies.”).
278. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Downsizing the SEC?, NAT’L L.J., June 22, 2009, at 22
(“Relatively speaking, the SEC deserves good grades for enforcement and investor protection, but
may have flunked the course on prudential financial supervision.”).
279. See Davis, Polk & Wardwell L.L.P., Summary of the Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act Passed by the House of Representatives, December 11, 2009 (Dec. 15, 2009),
http://www.sifma.org/uploadedFiles/SIFMA_Homepage/DPW-summary-wallstreet-reform.pdf.
The U.S. House of Representatives passed the Act on December 11, 2009. Id.
280. Id. at 15, 17.
281. See James Surowiecki, Public Humiliation, NEW YORKER, Sept. 29, 2008, at 30
(describing the most applicable result of two waves of IPO booms among investment banks in
recent decades: the ability of the previously private entities to “raise huge amounts of capital,
which, in turn, increased the amount of money they could borrow to leverage their bets”).
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moniker “national securities exchange” in return for guaranteeing to the
government that, in addition to serving as centers of capital formation and
transfer, they will simultaneously serve as self-regulatory organizations
(SROs).282 SRO examination for violations and transgressions is made
possible by the separate requirement that exchange member firms file a
monthly Financial and Operational Combined Uniform Single (FOCUS)
report detailing the firm’s financial condition.283 Yet, no cries have been
heard for either gross reform at the SRO level, or, alternatively, to eradicate
its obsolete warning system. Likewise, while the serious questions and
drastic ramifications abound, it is not altogether clear that the public wishes
to hold aggressive entrepreneurs accountable via criminal actions.284
282. Section 6 of the Securities Exchange Act (“National Securities Exchanges”), 15 U.S.C. §
78f (2006), requires of exchanges as follows:
(5) The rules of the exchange are designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative
acts and practices, to promote just and equitable principles of trade, to foster
cooperation and coordination with persons engaged in regulating, clearing, settling,
processing information with respect to, and facilitating transactions in securities, to
remove impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a free and open market and a
national market system, and, in general, to protect investors and the public interest; and
are not designed to permit unfair discrimination between customers, issuers, brokers, or
dealers, or to regulate by virtue of any authority conferred by this chapter matters not
related to the purposes of this chapter or the administration of the exchange.
(6) The rules of the exchange provide that (subject to any rule or order of the
Commission pursuant to section 78q(d) or 78(g)(2) of this title) its members and
persons associated with its members shall be appropriately disciplined for violation of
the provisions of this chapter, the rules or regulations thereunder, or the rules of the
exchange, by expulsion, suspension, limitation of activities, functions, and operations,
fine, censure, being suspended or barred from being associated with a member, or any
other fitting sanction.
(7) The rules of the exchange are in accordance with the provisions of subsection (d)
of this section, and in general, provide a fair procedure for the disciplining of members
and persons associated with members, the denial of membership to any person seeking
membership therein, the barring of any person from becoming associated with a
member thereof, and the prohibition or limitation by the exchange of any person with
respect to access to services offered by the exchange or a member thereof.
15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)5–7 (2006). In July of 2007, the investigative/prosecutorial arms of the two
largest SROs, the NYSE and the NASD, merged to form the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority (FINRA). Press Release, FINRA, NASD and NYSE Member Regulation Combine to
Form the Financial Industry Regulation Authority – FINRA (July 30, 2007),
http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2007/P036329.
283. The NYSE web site touts the FOCUS Report as giving the exchange “a complete, detailed
picture of member firms’ financial and operational conditions” and goes on to explain that all
member firms “must respond quarterly to several hundred questions about financial and
operational conditions and activities.” NYSE, Glossary, Financial and Operational Combined
Uniform Single Report (FOCUS), http://www.nyse.com/glossary/Glossary.html (last visited Feb.
17, 2010).
284. See Zachary Kouwe & Dan Slater, 2 Bear Stearns Fund Leaders are Acquitted, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 11, 2009, at A1 (describing the jury acquittal of two hedge fund managers of
securities fraud charges based upon their alleged misstatements to investors regarding the health
of funds invested heavily in mortgage securities).
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The analyses conducted by this Article served to illustrate that any
hindsight needs to be a movie reel as opposed to a snapshot, and that the
camera needs to focus more on the risk incentives permitted to prosper on
trading desks than on any trendy investment vehicles engaged thereby.
Clearly, the judiciary and the White House played an often downplayed yet
smoldering role in creating that risky climate; clearly Congress and the SEC
can bring on a cloudy day in a heartbeat.
Thus, as the GLBA and ill-advised SEC policies emerge as the most
damaging contributions to the Crisis, the expedient blame attributed to the
growth of the CDO or the CFMA’s exclusion of a sole investment product
seems too expedient. In light of management’s commitment to nontraditional structures and profit centers (both in anticipation of and after
enactment of the law), a related flaw in recent years appears to be in
government failing to commensurately staff and train the agencies. This is
supported by the words of Alan Greenspan, who in his speech to Congress
in October 2008 outlined the failures of Washington to comprehend the
regulatory task at hand, stating:
“I made a mistake in presuming that the self-interest of organizations,
specifically banks and others, were such that they were best capable of
protecting their own shareholders and their equity in the firms”. . . . “And
it’s been my experience, having worked both as a regulator for eighteen
years and similar quantities in the private sector, especially ten years at a
major international bank, . . . that the loan officers of those institutions
knew far more about the risks involved in the people to whom they lent
money than I saw even our best regulators at the Fed capable of
doing.”285

To make Wall Sreet appreciate the value of regulating itself thus seems
ideal. The concept may even be said to be historical. It was FDR himself
who, when introducing the first of the federal securities laws, noted that the
government could not vet all the nation’s stock offerings;286 the spirit of that
advice bears repeating as regulators scramble to find the cure for
malingering economic woes
Undoubtedly, the government plays a critical role in instilling such
diligence. As detailed herein, four vital sectors of government contributed
285. DAVID WESSEL, IN FED WE TRUST 65 (2009) (quoting Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan)
(emphasis added).
286. See CHARLES R. GEISST, WALL STREET: A HISTORY 230 (1997).
The Federal Government cannot and should not take any action which might be
construed as approving or guaranteeing that newly issued securities are sound in the
sense that their value will be maintained or that the properties which they represent will
earn profit. . . . There is however an obligation upon us to insist that every issue to be
sold in interstate commerce shall be accompanied by full publicity and information.
Id. at 228 (quoting a statement by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt made upon his submission
of the Securities Act of 1933 to Congress).
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to the atmospheric change attending the Crisis. “The movement to
deregulate the financial industry went too far by exaggerating the
resilience—the self-healing powers—of laissez-faire capitalism,” a pioneer
of the Chicago School of economics recently wrote.287 Maybe so, but, upon
inspection of the verdicts of populist trials, it appears that it was still agents
of the government who often helped to sell us the snake oil. As economist
and journalist Paul Krugman has argued: “Influential figures should have
proclaimed a simple rule: anything that does what a bank does, anything
that has to be rescued in crises the way banks are, should be regulated like a
bank.”288
This Article sought to test public perceptions of (and consequentially
specifically apportion blame to) an array of government sectors. As the
lingering autopsy of the 14,000 Dow Jones Industrial Average continues,
heightened scrutiny by Washington, D.C. appears mainly to cast blame in
old directions. This author thus suggests that the compass point towards an
amalgamated inquiry: The existing laws and framework failed simply to
instill in sophisticates the need to protect themselves from other
sophisticates. For, if all our scrutiny of financial relationships continues to
sound in metaphors involving sheep and wolves,289 we may never reach the
requisite understanding that the Crisis was caused by the well-heeled
fooling the well-heeled.290
Despite any controversy about the true author of the “laws and
sausages” quote, no one contests that the great Twain did advise so long
ago: “[N]o country can be well governed unless its citizens as a body keep
religiously before their minds that they are guardians of the law, and that
the law officers are only the machinery for its execution, nothing more.”291
Clearly, that machinery broke down in recent times, chiefly in keeping
iconic sophisticates from fatal avenues of speculation. Hopefully, a
progressive survey of the lessened defenses that allowed Wall Street to fail

287. John Cassidy, After the Blowup: Laissez-Faire Economists Do Some Soul-Searching—and
Finger-Pointing, NEW YORKER, Jan. 11, 2010, at 28 (quoting RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE
OF CAPITALISM, at xii (2009)).
288. KRUGMAN, supra note 18, at 163 (discussing the fall of the “shadow banking system” that
emerged globally in the last decade).
289. See, e.g., GEISST, supra note 286, at 230 (noting that the New Deal Congress was “bent
upon reforming banking so that the poachers and the gamekeepers were kept separate”).
290. As this Article goes to press, the Congressional Financial Crisis Oversight Commission
begins its hearings in Washington, D.C. As a noted Wall Street journalist has pointed out, the
focus has seemingly “shifted to new ground” in view of concerns that Goldman Sachs
simultaneously sold CDOs and hedged against their failure. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Wall St. Ethos
Under Scrutiny at Hearing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2010, at A1. In turn, Goldman’s CEO has
defended that such CDO purchasers were “professional investors who want[ed] this exposure.” Id.
291. MARK TWAIN & CHARLES DUDLEY WARNER, THE GILDED AGE 216 (Modern Library
Paperback 2006) (1873).
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to comprehend the dangers of Wall Street will aid in our collective repair of
those engines.

